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ABSTRACT
With the advancement of the next generation of nuclear fuel cycle facilities, concerns of the
effectiveness of nuclear facility safeguards have been increasing due to the inclusion of highly
enriched material and reprocessing capability into fuel cycles. Therefore, an extensive and
quantitative safeguard evaluation is required in order for the decision makers to have a consistent
measure to verify safeguards level of protection, and to effectively improve the current safeguard
scheme.
The framework presented in this study provides a systematic method for safeguard evaluation of
any nuclear facility. Using scenario analysis approach, a diversion scenario consists of target
material, target location, diversion technique, set of tactics to help elude the safeguards, and the
amount of material diverted per attempt. The success tree methodology and expert elicitation is
used to construct logical models and obtain the probabilities of basic events. Then proliferator
diversion success probabilities can be derived from the model for all possible scenarios in a given
facility.
Using Rokkasho reprocessing facility as an example, diversion pathways, uncertainty, sensitivity,
and importance measure analyses are shown. Results from the analyses can be used by the
safeguarder to gauge the level of protection provided by the current safeguard scheme, and to
identify the weak points for improvements. The safeguarder is able to further analyze the
effectiveness of the safeguard scheme for different facility designs, and the cost effectiveness
analysis will help the safeguarder allocate limited resources for maximum possible protection
against a material diversion.
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Title: Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Nuclear Facility Safeguards
By definition, the nuclear safeguard system comprises of an extensive set of measures by which
the safeguarder verifies the correctness and completeness of the declaration made by States about
their nuclear material and activities (IAEA 2001). States, in this case, are the non-nuclear weapon
states that have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which includes the agreement not to
manufacture or acquire a nuclear weapon by any mean. To ensure that States honor the
agreement, they must accept safeguards on all source of special fissionable material in all
peaceful nuclear activities within their territories by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). The goal of the IAEA safeguards is to detect the diversion of nuclear materials from
civilian to military purposes (IAEA 2002).
There are three types of verification measures used by the IAEA: nuclear material accountancy
tracks all inward and outward transfers and flows of material in a nuclear facility; physical
security is used to restrict access to nuclear material at the site of use; and containment and
surveillance detects unreported movements or tampering with the nuclear materials. The
safeguard scheme is designed to maintain the continuity of knowledge (CoK) of nuclear material
at all time inside a nuclear facility.
Nuclear safeguards of civilian nuclear technology is highly significant, since civilian nuclear
technology potentially contributes to nuclear weapon proliferation in the many ways, such as
supplying technologies used for weapon-grade material production, training technical experts
with knowledge that can be misused, justifying reasons for nuclear activities that can be for both
civilian and weapon programs, and providing sources of acquisition of weapon usable material
and equipments required for weapon construction (Bunn 2001).
From the start of the development of next generation nuclear fuel cycle facilities, which includes
production of highly enriched fuel and spent fuel reprocessing, there have been growing concerns
that current safeguard schemes used by the IAEA will not be sufficiently effective in preventing
proliferation(Barnaby 2002). The problem arises because of bulk reprocessing facilities handle
large amount of nuclear material, such that only a fraction of which is needed for construction of
nuclear weapon. When the daily throughputs of the material in these facilities are higher than the
signification quantity (SQ), which is the amount needed to construct a nuclear weapon, it is
difficult for the IAEA to detect the diversion in a timely manner. Therefore, the effectiveness of
the safeguards is essential, and a good safeguard evaluation is required in order to verify the level
of protection that they provide, and to effectively improve the current safeguard scheme.
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1.2 Nuclear Safeguard Evaluation
As mentioned in the previous section, safeguard evaluation is a significant tool for verification
and identification for improvements of a safeguard scheme. The evaluation is often a part of
nonproliferation assessments because there are many factors that could be involved in nuclear
proliferation. To reduce the complexity of the assessment, the problem must be decomposed into
manageable elements. Therefore, a typical analysis includes definition of a finite set of threats,
definition of barriers to proliferation, development of metrics, and segmentation of the system
being evaluated (NNSA 2003).
There are two common approaches for nonproliferation assessments. The first one is the
"attribute analysis". In this approach, the attributes of the system under evaluation are identified,
then the effects that these attributes have on the potential of proliferation are estimated. Typically,
these studies are qualitative and highly subjective. There are formal methods, such as the Multi-
Attribute Utility (MAU) model, that helps assisting in decision making from the results of these
studies.
The second approach is the "scenario analysis". The studies that use this approach usually
investigate the possible proliferator diversion scenarios and the processes undertaken to overcome
the barriers that prevent or detect the diversions. Results are the estimates of the probabilities that
the proliferator will succeed with those scenarios or pathways. Typically, these studies use logical
model and probability analysis to produce quantitative results. However, the accuracies of the
results rely heavily on the accuracies of the expert judgments of the probabilities.
In either case, the goal of safeguard evaluation is to be able to qualitatively or quantitatively
compare the effectiveness of the safeguard scheme to detect material diversion attempted by a
proliferator for different nuclear facilities, safeguard setups, or diversion scenarios. The results of
the evaluation will further be useful for the safeguarder to indentify where and how to improve
the current safeguard systems.
1.3 Previous and Current Works
This section provides a summary of the previous and current works in the area of safeguard
evaluation and proliferation resistance (PR).
The multi-attribute utility approach has been the most widely used among PR studies. In 2000, a
key study on PR assessment (Taylor 2000) was comprehensively performed by the task force on
Technological Opportunities to increase the Proliferation Resistance of Global Civilian Nuclear
Power Systems (TOPS). They identified the principal barriers and attributes, based upon the
measures determined in the earlier studies (National Science of Academy 1994) of the system
against proliferation threats, and evaluated these attributes qualitatively.
Other studies use some other means to assess the safeguards, e.g. using a network model called
"The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP)," which combines knowledge of the
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system, specific scenarios, and modeling objectives (Floyd H. Grant 1978); evaluating the
diversion sensitivity of the nuclear material by decision analysis techniques (Shipley 1978);
assessing proliferation risk by using weighted function of criteria for proliferation path ways
(Silvennoinen 1982).
There are previous works that have utilized success tree model as a tool to obtain the measure of
proliferation success probability, which is used as a mean for comparison between alternative fuel
cycle concepts (Golay In preparation) (Sentell Jr. 2002). They characterized the features of a
facility/fuel cycle that contributed to proliferation into material attractiveness, critical mass
production rate, probability of nominal yield, relative cost ratio, resources devoted, material
shielding/transport difficulty, and success probability of defeating the barriers. Subsequent work
further investigates the method by introducing the concept of competition between the
proliferator and the safeguarder into the proliferation assessment of a Modular Pebble Bed
Reactor (MPBR) (Ham 2005). This study demonstrates the use of expert elicitation to derive the
basic event probabilities as a function of proliferator level of effort for different material
diversion pathways. Currently, there is an on-going work to extend and apply the previous
developed methods to assess PR of the Sodium Fast Reactor Energy System by using risk-
informed and performance-based regulatory framework (E. Cavalieri d'Oro 2009).
The framework introduced in this study is designed to improve and demonstrate the applications
of the methodology used in previous works, focusing on the area of safeguard scheme evaluation
and analyses for all possible proliferator diversion scenarios, which include tactics to elude
safeguards and the amount of material diverted per attempt. The competition between the
proliferator and the safeguarder is clearly distinguished into the proliferator's selection of
diversion scenario that gives the highest diversion probability, and the safeguarder's facility
design choices and resources devoted to safeguards that increase the effectiveness of the
safeguard scheme.
1.4 Scope and Approach of this Framework
The objective of this study is to create a framework for an evaluation of a safeguard scheme in a
nuclear facility. This includes the assessment of proliferator material diversion success
probabilities, which are used to measure the effectiveness of the safeguards, for all of the possible
diversion scenarios. These probabilities are computed by utilizing a success tree model, and the
probabilities of the basic events are derived by the mean of expert elicitation.
The most important feature of the safeguard evaluation in this framework is the inclusion of
scenarios where the proliferator attempts to use concealment tactics to help elude the safeguards.
To accommodate this feature, the safeguards in this framework are separated into two types. The
first type is the primary safeguard, which is used to detect a material diversion, and the second
type is the supporting safeguard, which is used to detect any tactic that the proliferator might
attempt to help elude the primary safeguard. The analyses then can be carried out for all possible
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set of tactics to find the set that gives the highest proliferator diversion success probability and
identify which tactic provides the most contribution to the success probability.
The expert elicitation is also designed to derive probabilities of basic events as a function of the
costs of the safeguards. This allows the safeguarder to evaluate the cost effectiveness of the
safeguard scheme and better allocates the limited resources. In addition, the analyses of the same
safeguard scheme for different facility designs can be done to compare which design choice gives
higher safeguard effectiveness.
The evaluation demonstrated in this study is only for the effectiveness of the safeguards in
detecting a material diversion, assuming that the proliferator decides to make an attempt. It does
not include the probability that the proliferator will make an attempt. To evaluate the risk of
having a successful material diversion by a proliferator, the results from this framework must be
combined with the estimation of material attractiveness, which is the measure of the difficulty to
transport and use the material for construction of nuclear weapons. It is expected that the
safeguarder will devote more resources to the safeguard scheme of more attractive materials, thus
the safeguards for these materials are more effective than the ones for less attractive materials.
The methodology of the framework is designed to be systematic to provide uniform procedures
and analyses. Therefore, it can be easily applied for an evaluation of any safeguard system in any
nuclear facility. It is also modular in terms of distinguishing a safeguard system in to various
categories, thus the results from expert elicitation does not depend on any particular safeguard
system or diversion scenario. Therefore, the results can be used in the analysis of another similar
system without having to redo the expert elicitation.
The ultimate goal of this framework is to provide methodology of using probabilistic methods to
evaluate the effectiveness of safeguard schemes and identify the strengths and weaknesses of the
systems from material diversions and proliferator tactics, including analysis for the best way to
improve the system. Note that the framework does not aim to derive an accurate diversion success
probability for certain scenarios, but rather to use the probabilities to compare the effectiveness of
the safeguards for different proliferator scenarios and safeguard setups.
1.5 Structure of the Document
Chapter 2 gives the description of the success tree methodology for a quantitative evaluation of a
safeguard scheme. The details of each of the safeguard type and their sub-trees are shown. The
tactics to elude the safeguards are also identified along with the supporting safeguards that are
setup by the safeguarder to detect the tactics. Then the last section of the chapter shows how the
safeguards are laid out in a nuclear facility. For material accountancy, a facility is separated in to
material balance areas (MBAs), and the processes and material transferring between the MBAs
are identified as key measurement points (KMPs), which are the places where a material
diversion can occurs.
Chapter 3 provides the methods and the protocols for an expert elicitation to obtain the expert
judgments of the probabilities of the basic events in the success tree model. The advantages and
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disadvantages of the organization of the elicitation are discussed in details. It also carried out the
processes of converting the expert inputs to the desired probabilities of the basic events, and
discusses the readiness of the results for various types of application and analyses.
Chapter 4 starts out showing the details of the Rokkasho reprocessing facility in order to use it as
an example to explain the procedures to evaluate the safeguard scheme of a nuclear facility. The
actual safeguard systems in the facilities are shown and categorized into different types of
safeguards, which are discussed in Chapter 2. The locations and the functionalities of these
safeguards are the important factors for the identification of safeguard systems to detect the
possible scenarios. After the diversions scenarios have been indentified, the success tree model
can be constructed based upon the definitions and description described in the previous chapters.
Then the following sections show the analyses that can be done to evaluate the safeguard scheme,
including diversion pathway analysis, uncertainty analysis, sensitivity analysis, and importance
measure analysis. These analyses provide the methods to measure the effectiveness of the
safeguards both as a system and as an individual safeguard. By going through the calculation of
diversion success probability for every possible set of proliferator tactics, the ranking of the sets
of tactics will indicate the strength and weak points of the safeguard scheme.
Chapter 5 extends the analysis of the results from expert elicitation to evaluate the available
safeguards for different designs of a facility and the cost effectiveness of the resource devoted to
the safeguards by the safeguarder. In contrast to the discussion in Chapter 4, where the analysis
focuses on the scenario and tactics by the proliferator, this chapter presents the options for the
safeguarder to improve the effectiveness of the safeguards. The limitation in this case is then the
technical practicability of the designs and the safeguarder's available resources.
Chapter 6 summarizes the methodology of the entire framework and points out the factors that
affect the effectiveness of the success tree model and the expert elicitation. Possible
improvements of the safeguard evaluation processes are suggested and additional future works
are discussed.
17
18
Chapter 2 Success Tree Model
2.1 Success Tree Methodology
The success tree methodology is introduced here as a tool to evaluate the safeguards by
considering the probability that a proliferator will succeed in acquiring special nuclear material
(SNM) and pathways for diversion scenarios. The success tree logic diagram has the same
structure as the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) used in safety analyses, such as Probabilistic Risk
Assessment (PRA). However, in contrast of the top event being the failure of the system, the top
event in a success tree analysis is a success. Therefore, in order for the top event to be successful,
every event in the level below must also be successful.
In this case, for evaluation of a safeguard scheme, the top event of the success tree diagram is the
event where a proliferator successfully diverts SNM according to the specific scenario. There are
many possible diversion scenarios that the proliferator can use to divert material, depending on
the design or the facility. For each scenario, the proliferator diversion attempts will succeed only
when all of the safeguards that are designed to detect that specific attempt are eluded.
List of the types of safeguards
1. Material Accountancy (MA)
1.1. Destructive Analysis (DA)
1.2. Non-destructive Analysis (NDA)
1.2.1. Gamma Ray Spectrometry (GRS)
1.2.2. Neutron Counter (NC)
1.2.3. Heat Inspection (HI)
1.2.4. Weight Inspection (WI)
2. Containment and Surveillance (C/S)
2.1. Optical Surveillance (OS)
2.2. Seal (SL)
3. Operation Monitoring (OM)
3.1. ID Tracking (ID)
3.2. Movement Recording (MR)
3.3. Process Monitoring (PM)
3.4. Safeguard by the Inspector (SI)
4. Environmental Sampling (ES)
5. Portal Monitoring (PTM)
The schematic of the success tree diagram is shown in Figure 2-1. The figure shows the example
of the tree for the case that every safeguard types is in place to detect the diversion. In the actual
analysis, there will only be the safeguards that would detect the diversion under specific scenario.
The box that is labeled "PROLIFERATOR ATTEMPTS TO DIVERT SNM" is the initiating
event for the top event to occur. For the analysis concerning how likely that the top event will
happen, the probability that the proliferator will attempt a diversion can be derived from the
attractiveness of the material inside the facility as discussed in Chapter 1. It is expected that for
the material that has high chance of being diverted by a proliferator, the probability to
successfully elude all of the safeguards in place should be low.
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Figure 2-1 Success tree diagram showing the possible types of safeguard that the proliferator must elude in order to divert the material successfully
20
2.2 Nuclear Safeguard Success Tree Sub-Model
For a safeguard to be eluded, there are two types of diversion attempts that a proliferator can
make.
I. The proliferator attempts to elude the safeguard as it is working by design. For an
instance, the proliferator can divert small quantity of the material per each attempt, so
that amount of missing material is still within the safeguard expected measurement error,
or it is too small for the safeguard to detect.
2. The proliferator attempts to elude the safeguard by.using concealment tactics to prevent
the safeguard to work as intended. The tactics can be used to make modifications to the
material under detection, the hardware, or the software of the system.
Figure 2-2 shows portions of the success tree diagram for a neutron counter safeguard. The top
event labeled "NC IS ELUDED" refers to the case when the proliferator successfully eludes the
neutron counter.
Accuracy of
Measurement
(No Tactic)
i I
NCIS ELUDED BY PLACING
COMPENSATING MATERIALIN
DETECTION REGION
NCIS ELUDED BY NCIS ELUDED BY
HARDWARE SIGNAL/DATA
MODIFICATION MODIFICATION
Tactic B Tactic C
Vul nerabi lities to specific threat/tactics
Tactic D
Figure 2-2 Portion of the success tree diagram for a neutron counter
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NC IS ELUDED BY
USING DUMMY
MATERIAL
Tactic A
Basic Event to
be determined
The Success Tree diagram in Figure 2-2 describes the pathway that a proliferator has to follow in
order to succeed in his acquisition attempt. The acquisition attempt depends on the Proliferator's
capability to elude all the safeguards in place at a given location. Eluding the safeguard in this
case means to elude all the measurements resulting from the safeguard scheme present in a
selected location of the NES, or Material Balance Area (MBA). The top event, labeled "NC is
eluded," represents the capability to elude a neutron counter (NC), which depends on two main
factors. The first factor to consider is that, depending on the quantity of material subtracted, the
safeguard might not be able to detect it even in the absence of additional tactics. This is the case
when the proliferator acquires an amount of material that is below the threshold at which the
instrument detects the presence of a given material (e.g. the amount of plutonium nitrate flowing
in a pipe). The probability associated with this event, labeled as 'no tactic', can be inferred by
knowing the accuracy of the safeguard. This means that the proliferator, assuming he knows the
threshold of the instrument, does not need to produce an ad hoc tactic specifically intended for
this safeguard.
In the case that the amount of material is within the range of detection of this instrument, the
proliferator then needs to add an additional tactic selected from the four supportive tactics labeled
from A to D in the left lower portion of the tree. Each one of these tactics represents a specific
attack on the detection system or on the sample. Tactic A for an instance, expanded with a sub-
tree on the right, depicts the situation where the proliferator adds dummy materials to the sample
in order to elude the NC measurements and mask the illicit subtraction of material. In order to be
undetected, the proliferator needs to support this strategy with further actions, such as eluding
seals and optical surveillance (diamonds). These events in the success tree are shown as
undeveloped events because they have to be expanded further into their own success trees and the
probabilities of these events depend on the proliferator tactics to their supporting safeguards as
well.
The determination of the basic event (circle) labeled "Using dummy material is not detected by
NC" is the basic event that determines the potential vulnerability of the neutron counter to threat
A.
Note that there is another choice of tactic for the proliferator to use to elude the neutron counter.
This is shown as the event labeled "NC is not working by a fake accident". However, this tactic is
not considered as the event relating directly to the neutron counter because the tactic simply
breaks the functionality of the neutron counter and the only way that the tactic will be detected is
by the supporting safeguards, not by the neutron counter itself.
In conclusion, there are 5 basic events probability relating directly to the neutron counter as
shown in Table 2-1.
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Table 2-1. Basic Event probabilities and tactics for a neutron counter
Tactic Basic Event Probability Tactic Description
Probability that a proliferator will Depending on the neutron counter uncertainty of
No Tactic successfully elude the neutron counter measurement, proliferator diverts the materialNo Tacticass y ecthe nfor an amount that is within the expected error
without any tactics of measurement
Probability that a proliferator will Proliferator replaces missing material with
Tactic A successfully elude the neutron counter another neutron source, such as minor actinides
by using dummy material or fission products
Probability that a proliferator will Proliferator places compensating material with
Tactic B successfully elude the neutron counter the same mass as those diverted in the detectionby placing compensating material in region, such as on the surface of the pipe, or
the detection region between the container and the detector.
r wProliferator modifies the detector to give moreProbability that a proliferator will neutron count than normal, or modifies the
Tactic C successfully elude the neutron counter electronic circuit to send more signals to theby modifying the detector/hardware processing unit.
Probability that a proliferator will Proliferator modifies the software to store the
Tactic D successfully elude the neutron counter desired output or access the record to modify the
by modifying the signal/data data.
In addition, these basic events probabilities are not independent but a function of other variables,
depending on the safeguard. The abbreviations of the safeguards are defined in Section 2.1
Table 2-2. Factor affecting the probability of the safeguard to detect the diversion
Factors _Safeguards
DA GRS NC HI WI OS SL ID MR PM S1 ES PTM
Total mass of
the material * * e e e e
under detection
Mass of the
diverted
material under
detection
Cost of the
safeguard
Material Form 00 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Material
Geometry under 0 0 0 0 0
detection
Detection Time 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Background /
Interference
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Since the material form, material geometry, detection time, and the background are given by the
design of the facility. The main variables that are affecting the proliferator success probability are
the mass under detection and the cost of the safeguard.
* The probability that the safeguard is eluded without tactic can be a function of the mass
of the material that is being measured (M), and also a function of the resources devoted to
the safeguard, or its final cost (C).
* The vulnerability measured in terms of the proliferator probability to succeed with tactics
can be a function of the overall safeguard cost (C).
In this framework, there are two types of safeguard related to the proliferator tactics
1. Primary Safeguards: These safeguards are used to detect material diversion attempts. A
proliferator will try to use tactics to elude these safeguards in order to divert the material
without being detected. All primary safeguards that are in place to detect proliferator
diversion attempts must be eluded for the proliferator to succeed.
2. Supporting Safeguards: These safeguards are used to detect tactics that a proliferator can
use to elude the primary safeguards. Secondary safeguards that are in place to detect the
proliferator tactics must be eluded for the proliferator to succeed. This type of safeguard
is shown in diamond shape inside the success tree, indicating that this is an "undeveloped
event" because the probability of this event also depends on the proliferator's choice to
use any tactic on these supporting safeguards.
Table 2-3 contains the summary of proliferator tactics to elude primary and supporting
safeguards.
Table 2-3. Summary of possible proliferator tactics that can be used to elude safeguards
Proliferator Tactics Safeguards
DA GRS NC HI WI OS SL ID MR PM SI ES PTM
Avoid random sampling
Modify the sample e 0
Use dummy material e * * * *
Modify detector/hardware e0 * * e
Modify signal/data * e * * * * e *
Placing compensating material
in the detection region
Repair/Replace the broken seal
Use fake ID device
Prevent physical inspection by
the inspector
Bribe the inspector
Cleanup material traces
Use shielding container
Faking an accident to break the
safeguard
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Table 2-4 shows the three supporting safeguards that are in place to detect proliferator tactics;
Optical Surveillance (OS), Seal (SL), and Safeguard by the Inspector (SI). The table also shows
specifically the type or the location of the safeguard for each tactic.
Table 2-4. Summary of the supporting safeguards that are used to detect proliferator tactics
Tactics Safeguards that are detecting the tacticsProliferatorS SL SI
Avoid random sampling Random sampling
Modify the sample Sample Seal Sample Monitoring
Use dummy material Material OS Material Seal
Modify detector/hardware System OS System Seal
Modify signal/data System OS System Seal
Placing compensating material in System OS System Seal
the detection region
Repair the broken seal Seal OS Seal
Replace the broken seal Seal OS Seal
Use fake ID device Material OS
Prevent physical inspection by Facility OS
the inspector
Bribe the inspector Inspector
Cleanup material traces Facility OS
Use shielding container Facility OS
Faking an accident to break the Facility OS Accident Inspection
safeguard
Following this section are the details and the success
Safeguards Techniques and Equipment 2003).
tree model of each safeguard type (JAEA,
Destructive Analysis (DA)
Figure 2-3. Destructive analysis success tree
The destructive analysis is used to determine elemental
composition, elemental assay, or isotopic composition of
the sample, which is randomly taken from the processes
inside a facility. All part of the sample is consumed in
the analysis, where the sample is irreversibly altered
(dissolved, radiochemically purified). DA has better
precision than Non-Destructive Analysis (NDA) because
the effect of the matrix can be eliminated or corrected.
There are two types of destructive analysis:
Elemental analysis: NBL Davies and Gray titration,
MacDonald and Savage titration, Controlled potential
coulometry, Ignition gravimetry, K-edge X ray
densitometry, Wavelength dispersive X ray fluorescence
spectrometry, Isotopic dilution mass spectrometry,
Plutonium (VI) spectrophotometry,
Isotopic analysis: Thermal ionization mass spectrometry,
High-resolution gamma ray spectrometry with Ge
detector, Gamma ray spectrometry with Nal detector,
Alpha spectrometry. Since DA requires the inspector to
randomly collect samples and send them to a laboratory,
a proliferator can attempt to elude DA by making the
inspectors collect samples from certain areas, or modify
the samples during the transportation.
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Non-Destructive Analysis (NDA)
NCN-DESTRUCTIVE NDA system measures nuclear material without
ANALYSIS ISELUDED alteration or direct contact with the item under analysis.
Most NDA techniques measure radiation, spontaneous
or stimulated, from nuclear material items. Comparing
to destructive analysis, NDA is faster, cheaper and can
NN-DESTRUCTIVE r NCN-DEBRUCflVE perform in situ, however there is much higher
ANA LYSIS ISNOT ANALYSIS IS ELUODih hee fu
WANKIG BY A FAKE WHLEWOING uncertainty in the results. There are four main
ACCcategories of non-destructive analysis; gamma ray
NDA1 spectrometry, neutron counter, heat inspection, and
weight inspection. Proliferator tactics to elude all of the
NDA ISELDEDBY NDA ISELUDEDWITHEUT safeguards of this type are similar. There are four main
PROEIFERATORS TACTIC PROFERATORSTACTIC tactics; hardware modification, software modification,
using dummy material and placing compensating
NDAPT N Tmaterial in the detection region. The actual tactics are
different because each type of NDA is detecting
NDA ISEEUDED BY NDA ISEEUDEDBY different property of the material and some tactics are
RICDO ARE PEAC EATING easier for some types than the other.
DEl-ECTIONREGION
Gamma ray spectrometry (GRS) measures the
distribution of intensity of gamma radiation from the
sample versus the energy of each photon. Gamma rays
NDAE Y USN D Y have well defined energies that are characteristic of the
MODIFCATION isotopes emitting them. When combined with a
measurement of intensities, the gamma ray energies can
provide quantitative information on the amount of
material that is present. The basis of all gamma ray
Figure 2-4. Non-destructive analysis success tree detector systems is the collection of liberated electrical
charge to produce a voltage pulse whose amplitude is proportional to the gamma ray energy. GRS can be
used to detect 186keV gamma ray from U-235 in enriched uranium, verify plutonium isotopes as well as
decay products, and check the date of discharged of eradiated fuel by measuring 662keV gamma ray from
Cs-137. There are two types of GRS; Attended mode such as Handheld Monitor System (HM-5), Inspector
Multichannel Analyzer (IMCA), Spent Fuel Attribute Tester (SFAT), Improved Cerenkov Viewing Device
(ICVD); and unattended mode such as Input Flow Verification System (CONS), Entrance Gate Monitor
(ENGM), Spent Fuel Bundle Counter (VIFB), and Core Discharge Monitor (VIFC). There are three types
of detector; Nal has higher efficiency, but low energy resolution, Ge has higher resolution, but must be
operated at very low temperature, CdZnTe has highest detection efficiency and does not need cooling.
Neutron Counter (NC) measures the number of neutrons radiated from the sample that are passing through
the detector. To know the amount of specific material, isotopic abundance must be known or verified,
typically by means of high-resolution gamma ray measurement. There are many types of NC; Neutron
Coincidence Counting is a passive detector system used to determine the mass of Pu based on spontaneous
fission, Multiplicity Counting uses triple coincidence parameters to solve for mass, Active Neutron Assay
is an active system that places a random neutron source in the cavity of a coincidence counter, and Active
Delayed-Neutron Assay uses a sensitive detector to detect the delayed neutron after interrogating the
sample with neutron source. The two most common types of neutron detector are He-3 and BF 3 gas filled
proportional detectors.
Heat Inspection (HI) measures the heat radiated from the sample. Same as NC, the measurement must be
combined with isotopic analysis to obtain mass of specific material. Plutonium and uranium emit heat from
alpha-particle absorption in the sample. Plutonium produces 2-12 W/kg of heat, depending on the isotopic
composition. For low burnup plutonium the principle heat source is Pu-239, but for high burn up
plutonium, the major contribution comes from Pu-238 and Am-24 1. There are a few different types of HI:
calorimetry, temperature sensor, and infrared camera.
Weight Inspection (WI) verifies and monitoring the gross weight of the material in any forms. Example of
weight inspection safeguards are weighting scale, precision load cell, etc.
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Optical Surveillance (OS)
Figure 2-5. Optical surveillance success tree
Seal (SL)
The main goal of optical surveillance is to provide
continuity of knowledge about nuclear materials and
other items of safeguards significance between on-site
inspection visits. Optical surveillance is intrinsically an
unattended technique that can be used to record images
only, or it may be integrated with other unattended
monitoring equipment to provide nuclear measurement,
containment history and other data. Effective
surveillance is achieved when a camera field of view
covers the entire area of safeguards interest to capture
the movement of safeguarded items. The following are
the different types of optical surveillance; Single
Camera: All-in-one surveillance, mains operated
(ALIS) and portable battery operated (ALIP), Digital
single camera optical surveillance (DSOS); Multi
Camera: Server digital image surveillance (SDIS),
Digital Multi- Camera Optical Surveillance (DMOS),
FAST company surveillance system (FAST); Short
Term Surveillance: All-in-one surveillance portable
(ALIP), Surveillance for Remote Monitoring: Server
digital image surveillance (SDIS); Underwater TV:
Underwater TV (UWTV), Underwater viewing device
(UWVD). To elude OS, a proliferator can generate fake
images by modifying the cameras or falsify video data.
Seal is used to secure materials, documents or any other
important items in a tamper-proof containment. The
purpose of the seals is to provide evidence of any
unauthorized attempt to gain access to the secured
material. Seals do not provide any kind of physical
protection, nor were they designed to provide such
protection. Seal types are separated into Single Use
Seals: Metal cap seal (CAPS), Improved adhesive seal
(VOID), which are traditionally used by the
safeguarder. The other type is the In situ verifiable
seals: Fiber Optic General Purpose Seal or COBRA
seal (FBOS), Ultrasonic Seal (ULCS), Ultrasonic
Sealing Bolt (USSB), and Variable Coding Seal System
(VCOS). Possible locations to use seal: Material
Container, Sample container, safeguard system
container, MBA entrance and exit. To elude seal, a
proliferator can break the seal and try to repair it to the
original condition or replace the seal with an identical
one to fool the inspectors. For seals that are digitally
recorded, a proliferator can attempt to modify the
records that show seals have been broken.
Figure 2-6. Seal success tree
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ID Tracking (ID)
ID IRACKINGSYSIEM IS The purpose of ID Tracking is to verify and keep
EEUDED track of the location of the container of material,
such as cylinder, canister, glovebox, or assembly, at
ID all time. ID tracking can be used to track the
material both inside the facilities and outside during
IDTRACKING SYSTEM IS IDTRACKING SYSTEM IS its transportation between facilities. The following
ACCIO B are the most common types of ID Tracking;
Barcode, Camera ID, Radio-frequency
ID1 Identification (RFID), Laser Identification (Laser
ID), and Global Positioning System (GPS). To
ID SYSTEM IS E DIED IDSYSTEM IS EDED elude ID tracking system, a proliferator can modify
BYPRCUF RATOR'S WIPEEOUT TACTIC the hardware, including the detectors or the tracking
TACTIC FIEJEIFERATORS TCI
device on the material container, or modify the
IDPT Dsignals/data in the processing system. For some
systems, a proliferator can use faking devices to
fool detectors from detecting that the material is
YDETER/HRDWARE BYUSI AKEID missing.
ID SYSTEM ISEWDED
MG)1FICATON
Figure 2-7. ID Tracking success tree
Movement Recording (MR)
MOVEM ENT RECORDNG Movement Recording system is a sensor system
SYSTEM ISELDDED used to record the movement of the material or
equipments inside the facility. The common use is
to detect that the material in the storage or in the
reactor core does not move during the unscheduled
time. The examples for movement recording system
SYST EM SNOT WOR KING SYSTEM ISELUDED are Motion Sensor (MS) or Position Tracking
BYA FAKEACCIDENT WHILEWORKING System (PTS). To elude movement recording
M R1 system, a proliferator can modify the sensor, or the
software/data of the processing unit to not record
any movement occurred during material diversion.
MRSYSTEM ISELUDED MRSYSTEM ISELUDED
BYPROLIFERATOR'S WITHOUT
TACTC PROLFERATOR'STACTIC
M RPT
MR SYSTEM ISELLDED MR SYSTEM ISELUDED
YDETECTOR/HARDWAR BYSIGNAUDATA
MODIFICATION M ODIFICATION
|M RMA
Figure 2-8. Movement recording success tree
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Process Monitoring (PM)
Figure 2-9. Process monitoring success tree
Safeguard by Inspector (SI)
Figure 2-10. Safeguard by inspector success tree
Process monitoring system is used to monitor the
processes in a nuclear facility to verify that the
facility is operating as expected. There are many
methods that a proliferator can do to change the
processes in order to facilitate diversion scenarios,
such as changing power of a nuclear reactor, modify
the chemical separation process in a reprocessing
facility, increase the enrichment of uranium in an
enrichment facility, etc. There are three most
commonly used process monitoring; Pressure
Monitoring (Electromanometer), Flow Monitoring,
and Power Monitoring. To elude process monitoring
system, a proliferator can modify the sensors or
detectors to give expected signals. Same as other
safeguard systems with processing unit, a
proliferator can also attempt to modify the recorded
data or software of the system.
Safeguard conducted by the inspectors including
facility inspection, taking random sample for
destructive analysis, verify the data of the
unattended safeguard system, and monitor the
facility operation, such as reactor refueling.
Following are the list of SI:
- Routine Inspection: Physical Inventory
Verification (PIV) and Design Information
Verification (DIV)
- Safeguard System Inspection: Inspectors inspect
the unattended safeguard system; seal, optical
surveillance, non-destructive analysis system.
- Random Sampling: Inspectors collect random
sample of the material for destructive analysis or
swipe random surface for environmental sampling
- Sample Monitoring: Inspectors monitor the
collected sample during the inspection and in transit
from the site to the safeguarder's laboratory
- Accident Inspection. Examples of fake accidents
are electrical accident, such as electrical circuit
tripping, loss of power, short circuit, system
overheat, fire accident, such as fire, explosion, and
physical accident, such as accidental collision or
facility operation mistake.
To elude SI, a proliferator can bribe the inspectors
or create a situation where the inspectors cannot
access the target areas to perform inspection.
29
Environmental Sampling (ES)
ENVIRONMENTAL
SAM PLING IS ELUDED
ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL
SAM PLING IS ELUDED BY SAM PLING IS ELUDED
PROLFERATOR'STACTIC WITHOUT
PROLFERATOR'STACTIC
ESESWT 
s 
s
SAM PLING IS ELUDED BY SAM PILING IS ELUDED BY
AVOIDING RA NDOM CLEANING UP M AT
SA RS P IGTEST
ENVIRONMENTA L
SA M PL MODIFICATON
Figure 2-11. Environmental sampling success tree
Collection of environmental samples at or near a
nuclear site combined with ultrasensitive analytical
techniques such as mass spectrometry, particle
analysis, and low level radiometric techniques can
reveal signatures of past and current activities in
locations where nuclear material is handled.
Environmental Sampling is designed to detect the
unusual or unexpected activity inside the facility,
such as movement of the SNM or extra processes
that are not reported to the inspectors. Samples are
analyzed in either bulk or particle mode, depending
on the sampling objectives and the activity levels of
the swipes. Types of ES; Screening of samples, such
as low level gamma ray spectrometry, x-ray
fluorescence spectrometry, alpha/beta counting;
Isotopic and Elemental Analysis such as pulse
counting thermal ionization mass spectrometry,
scanning electron microscopy with electron probe
analysis, fission track method, and secondary ion
mass spectrometry. Besides the similar tactics to
elude DA, a proliferator can attempt to clean up the
traces of material along the diversion pathways.
Portal Monitoring (PTM)
PCRTAEMONlTmING Portal monitoring system is used to monitor the
SYSTEM ISEEUDED gates for everything that is going and out of the
facility. The system is designed to record all of the
properties of both the material and facility personnel
that are crossing the boundaries of the facility to
PRTALMONITLRING PQRTALM CNITRING ensure that there is no extra material going in and no
SYSTEM IS NOT WOFR4QNG SYSTEM ISFLU DIED mtra eie h
BY A FAKE TACENG WHLE WING stolen material getting out. Besides attacking the
hardware and software of the system, the
proliferator can also use a shielding container to
shield the radiation of the diverted material when
PTM SYSTEM ISELUDED TIM SYSTEM ISELUDED passing through the portal monitoring system.
PR ATOR'S PROUFEAATORSTACTIC The following are the possible component of PTM
X-Ray Spectrometry, Portal Gamma Ray,
Spectrometry, Portal Neutron Detector, Infrared
Camera, Temperature Sensor, Weight Scale. To
PTM SYSTEM ISEEUDED PTM SYSTM ISEEUDED elude portal monitoring system, a proliferator can
MODIICATEIRCORNA BS EE modify the detector/haTdware or signal/data of the
system similar to other unattended system. One
extra tactic that a proliferator can attempt is to place
the diverted material inside a shielding container to
PTM SYSTEM ISEEUDED prevent the system from detecting the radiations or
BYSIFNAAIANproperties of the material.
Figure 2-12. Portal monitoring success tree
For complete descriptions and success trees for all types of safeguards, see Appendix A.
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2.3 Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities
To identify the list of safeguards that are related to the possible diversion scenarios, the complete
information about the safeguard scheme is needed. This section contains the information about
the processes and possible safeguard setup for the major facilities inside the nuclear fuel cycle
that are the likely targets of a material diversion. Figure 2-13 shows the nuclear fuel cycle with
the material flow for both closed and open fuel cycle.
Fuel Assemblies Spent Fuel
Open Fuel Cycle
Pu
Closed Fuel Cycle
Waste
Figure 2-13. Nuclear fuel cycle and the material flow
There are four major facilities in the fuel cycle that are attractive for proliferation.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Nuclear Enrichment Facility
Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Facility
Nuclear Reactor
Nuclear Reprocessing Facility
Each facility is separated into several Material Balance Areas (MBAs) where the material flowing
in and out will be accounted. For example, the list of current safeguards and possible safeguard
setup in an aqueous reprocessing facility (Michael H. Ehinger 2009) are shown in Figure 2-14.
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Nuclear Reprocessing Facility (Aqueous- Oxide Fuel)
MBA1 c MBA2 [jF-7j:
U/Pu/MA/FPs
Enter SpentFuel Chemical
Storage Separation
KMP-A KMP-C
U/Pu/MA/FPs PuNtrate U Nitrate
Chopping/ 
_jPu
Dissolution KmP-2 UPurification U DenitrationPurification
KMP-B
- -PuNitrate KMP-D UNtre KMP-1 KMP-F
Cladding/Structure KMP-3 KMP-5 KMP-6 003
I IMBA3 MBA4 MBA5 KMP-7
waste CoEoMX UX
Process/ KP
SoaeDenitration Kr P Storage Storage
I KMVP-G KMP-H KMP-1 KMP-
KMP-12 KMP-10 KMP-11
Exit Exit Exit
Destructive Analysis
Gamma Ray Spectrometry
Neutron Counter
Heat Inspection
Weight Inspection
Optical Surveillance
MR Movement Recording
IDTracking
PM Process Monitoring
S Safeguard by the Inspector
E Environmental Sampling
P Portal Monitoring
Process
IMBA1P .......S.  
-,.-.-.-.-.
KMP-A Inventory Key Measurement Point
Material Balance Area KMIP-1 Material Flow Key Measurement Point
Safeguard System
Material Receipt
Material Transfer within Facility
Material Shipment
Seal
Figure 2-14. Aqueous reprocessing facility diagram
The scheme above shows the flow of the material and the safeguards scheme in an Aqueous Fuel
Reprocessing Facility (ARF). The processes of this facility are separated into five material
balance areas (MBA) where the material flows in and out of the areas are measured for material
accountancy. Each MBA contains different types of safeguards that are suitable for the processes
and form of the material within the area. The safeguards are located at the Key Measurement
Points (KMP) throughout the facility. There are two types of KMP; one is Inventory Key
Measurement Point (IKMP), where the safeguards monitor the material inside the process or
storage. The other type is Flow Key Measurement Point (FKMP), where the safeguards monitor
the amount of material transferring between two processes.
Table 2-5 and Table 2-6 show the details of the each material balance area and key measurement
point in the facility.
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Table 2-5. Material Balance Area (MBA) of an aqueous reprocessing facility
Material Balance Area Nuclear Material Safeguards
Optical Surveillance
MBAl: Feed Storage & Disassembly Area Spent Fuel Assembly Gamma Ray SpectrometryChopped Spent Fuel Neutron Counter
ID Tracking
Spent Fuel Process Monitoring
MBA2: Chemical Separation Area Pu Nitrate Destructive Analysis
Heat Inspection
Optical Surveillance
MBA3: Waste Process & Storage Area Solid Waste NGamma Ray Spectrometry
ID Tracking
MBA4: Co-Denitration Area Pu Nitrate Neutron CounterU Nitrate Destructive Analysis
Optical Surveillance
Seal
MBA5: Product Storage Area MOX Gamma Ray SpectrometryUOX Neutron Counter
Weight Inspection
ID Tracking
Optical Surveillance
Throughout Facility Diverted Material Environmental Sampling
Portal Monitoring
Table 2-6. Key Measurement Point (KMP) of an aqueous reprocessing facility
Inventory KMP Flow KMP
" KMP-A: Spent Fuel Storage * KMP-1: Receipt of Spent Fuel Assembly
" KMP-B: Chopping and Dissolution * KMP-2: Transfer of Spent Fuel from MBA1 to MBA2
Process * KMP-3: Transfer of Waste from MBAl to MBA3
* KMP-C: Chemical Separation Process e KMP-4: Transfer of Waste from MBA2 to MBA3
* KMP-D: Pu Purification Process * KMP-5: Transfer of Pu from MBA2 to MBA4
* KMP-E: U Purification Process e KMP-6: Transfer of U from MBA2 to MBA4
* KMP-F: U Denitration Process e KMP-7: Transfer of UOX from MBA2 to MBA5
* KMP-G: Waste Process and Storage * KMP-8: Transfer of MOX from MBA4 to MBA5
* KMP-H: Co-Denitration Process e KMP-9: Transfer of Waste from MBA4 to MBA3
* KMP-I: MOX Storage a KMP-10: Shipment of MOX
* KMP-J: UOX Storage e KMP- 11: Shipment of UOX
* KMP-12: Shipment of Waste
With this information, the list of safeguards needed for the elicitation and the possible diversion
scenarios can be identified for safeguard evaluation. Chapter 4 explains the details and
methodology of the analyses used to evaluate a reprocessing facility.
For full details and diagrams of all four facilities, please see Appendix B. Note that the safeguards
shown in these facilities are the possible safeguard schemes. The actual safeguards in each
facility type are varied.
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Chapter 3 Expert Elicitation
3.1 Objective and Approach of the Elicitation Process
The objective of the elicitation is to obtain expert judgment estimates of basic events probabilities
for the success tree model.
Approach of the elicitation
1. Design and distinguish sets of questions regarding the safeguards into different categories
depending on the expertise of the experts.
2. The main elicitation process is conducted by a questionnaire, with prior phone interview
for preparation, and the follow up phone interview for feedbacks.
There are two categories of questions for each safeguard.
1. Category I: Questions relating to the basic events probability for the case of no
proliferator tactic. In this case, the safeguard is assumed to be working in the expected
condition with expected environment.
2. Category II: Questions relating to the basic events probabilities for the case with
proliferator concealment tactics. In this case, a proliferator attempts to attack the
safeguard system, or modify the material or environment under the safeguard to help
elude the safeguard from detecting the diversion.
Category I Questions:
The questions ask for the safeguard uncertainty of measurement, which can be used to derive the
proliferator success probability to elude the safeguard without additional tactic.
There are two types of safeguard functionality to be considered, see Figure 3-1.
1. Detection type: The safeguard is used to detect diverted material or a diversion activity
by a proliferator. The conclusion from the outputs of the safeguard is a binary decision
whether the safeguard detects a diversion or not. For examples, an optical surveillance
detects some unusual activities, or a seal shows that it has been broken, etc.
2. Measurement type: The safeguards is used to measure and account for the amount of
targeted material or verify the level of facility operations. The conclusion from the
outputs of the measurement is whether or not some amount of material are missing, or the
current level of processes matches well enough with the expected value. For example, a
temperature sensor measures the heat coming from the material and verifies that the
result of the measurement is in the range of acceptable values.
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Detecton Only
Optical Surveillance
Seal
ID Tracking
Movement Recording
Gamma and Neutron Portal Mor
Both Measurement Only
Gamma Ray Spectrometry Heat Inspection
Neutron Counter Weight Inspection
Destructive Analysis Process Monitoring
Environmental Sampling
nitor Gamma and Neutron Detector for Accountancy
Figure 3-1. Difference between safeguard with detection and measurement functionality
For the safeguard of measurement type, the elicitation questions ask for the uncertainty of the
measurement with 95% level of confidence as a function of the total material under detection.
The uncertainty of measurement is expected to decrease when the total mass of material increases
until it reaches saturation. See Figure 3-2 for an example plot.
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Figure 3-2. Example plot of material mass versus uncertainty of measurement
For the safeguard of detection type, the elicitation question only asks for the uncertainty of
measurement with 95% level of confidence at the background level.
By asking the questions in term of the uncertainty of measurement, the expert can answer them
more accurately and conveniently without much calculation required. The conversion of expert
inputs to the proliferator diversion success probabilities will be described in Section 3.4
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Category II Questions:
The questions ask for the probability that the proliferator tactic will successfully help elude the
safeguard from detecting a material diversion, and its error with 95% level of confidence. The
inputs from the experts are the probabilities of the basics event, thus they do not required any
further calculation. Figure 3-3 shows the example inputs for this type of questions.
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Figure 3-3. Plot of cost of safeguard (in $millions) versus proliferation success probability
The probabilities to elude the safeguard depend on the cost of safeguard setup. The cost that is
associated to each tactic is the cost of safeguard modifications, equipments, components, and
software that affects the proliferator success probability to elude the safeguard with the specific
tactic.
3.2 Elicitation Protocols
The following list shows the steps for elicitation process used in this framework. It is adapted
from ten steps process presented in NUREG-1 150 (Hora 1989).
Step 1: Identification and selection of issues
Step 2: Selection of experts
Step 3: Provision of a uniform background database and preparation material
Step 4: Expert training and preparation for the elicitation
Step 5: Expert Elicitation
Step 6: Analyses based on aggregated expert inputs and feedbacks
Step 7: Finalizing expert inputs
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Step 1: Identification and selection of issues
The goal of this elicitation process is to derive the success probabilities of the basic events in the
safeguard evaluation success tree model. The questions to be answered by the experts are defined
by the list of safeguards in the tree, the possible tactics that the proliferator can use to elude those
safeguards, and the factors that will affect their detection failure probabilities.
Setup of the safeguards must be clearly defined along with identification of target material and
design of the processes within the facility.
Step 2: Selection of experts
For each safeguard, the experts are chosen based on their expertise and experience in the area.
Since there are different tactics that the proliferator can use to elude each safeguard, such as in the
case of the non-destructive analysis; the proliferator can modify the hardware, software, using
dummy material, or placing compensating material. For example, the experts who designed the
safeguard will be able to provide their judgments for the uncertainty of measurement and the
modification to the material under detection, while the experts who designed the software to run
the safeguard will be able to provide their judgments for the probability that the proliferator will
succeed in hacking the software or modify the stored data.
Step 3: Provision of a uniform background database and preparation material
The background material and the description, which explain the nature of the problem and the
assessment being conducted, are prepared prior to contacting the experts. The document contains
the structure of the framework, the success tree model, and the safeguard system description
along with the details of the facility and material under studied. Example of results and
calculation are also included. This process will ensure the uniform background and information
among the experts.
Step 4: Expert training and preparation for the elicitation
This process is conducted by a telephone interview, in order to help the experts familiarize with
the basic probability concept and success tree logic diagram. The interview also includes a
discussion with the experts about the details of safeguard's functionality, components, and
limitations. Specific safeguard setup will be defined, and all of the possible tactics to elude the
safeguard will be listed, discussed, and categorized, to be used by every expert for the elicitation.
To ensure the quality and applicability of the inputs from the experts, the experts are asked to
identify the safeguard detection range and the cost of the safeguard for different setup and
components.
By considering the safeguard at specific material balance area of a facility, the main factors that
will affect the uncertainty of measurement and the proliferator success probability are the mass of
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the material under detection, and the cost of the safeguard. Therefore, the applicable range of
these factors, depending on the safeguard, will be derived from the discussion with the experts for
use in the questionnaire. See Table 3-1 for the definitions of the reference points of the two
factors.
Table 3-1. Factors affecting the variables in the elicitation and their reference points
Point on the detectable range
Factor
Point Description
Mio, Lowest total mass in the detectable range
Total mass of the material M Base case total mass, which is the regular mass of
under detection MC material under detection region in the facility
Mhigh Highest total mass in the detectable range
Cmi, Minimum cost of the safeguard for it to operate
Cb Base case cost, which is the regular cost of typical setCost of the safeguard C up of the safeguard
C Cost of the safeguard the will make it operate at the
optimal efficiency
There are two types of the cost of the safeguard regarding the proliferator diversion success
probability. First is the cost of the safeguard setup that affects the efficiency of the system. The
other is the cost of safeguard setup that affects the vulnerability of the safeguard to proliferator
tactics. For the latter case, these costs will be different depending on the type of tactics that
proliferator will attempt to use.
Since the setup of the safeguard, such as the position of the detector, the distance between the
detector and the material, the number of the detectors etc., affects the safeguard geometric
efficiency, and thus affect the inputs from expert judgment. It is important that these are clearly
defined and consistent between experts. In addition, by specifically defining the ranges of the
factors, it ensures that the experts will provide probability estimates at the same reference points
for further analyses.
Step 5: Expert Elicitation
The individual elicitation is completed by a questionnaire. The questionnaire contains questions
asking for expert judgments of the uncertainties of measurement and the success probabilities of
the proliferator tactics. For each variable, the questions will ask for the inputs at three different
reference points that were derived in the last step of the elicitation process.
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The following three tables show examples of questions to be filled in the questionnaire
Table 3-2. Questions for the uncertainty of measurement for detection type safeguard
Safeguard Uncertainty of Measurement (%) with 95% confidence level
Estimated Cost Point Estimate at the background level
Cmin = $min
Cbc =$bc
CoPt =$Op
Table 3-3. Questions for the uncertainty of measurement for measurement type safeguard
Safeguard Uncertainty of Measurement (%) with 95% confidence level
Estimated Cost Total Mass = Mio, Total Mass = Mbc Total Mass = Mhigh
Cmin = $min
Cbc = $bc
CoPt = $Opt
Table 3-4. Questions for a proliferator success probability of a tactic that will elude the safeguard
Proliferator success probability of tactic A
Safeguard Estimated
Cost Point Estimate * Error with 95% Level of
Confidence
CA,mnin = $min
CA,bc = $bc
CA,opt = Sopt
Along with the questionnaire, the expert will receive a supporting document that includes the full
details of the safeguard setup, information of the material under detection, the definition and list
of possible proliferator tactics in each category, and the details of the safeguard system at
different costs.
Step 6: Analyses based on aggregated expert inputs and feedbacks
This step includes the analysis the questionnaire results from the experts, following by a phone
interview with the experts to discuss about the issues that may arise and confirm the results of the
elicitation. The uncertainties of measurement are converted to the detection failure probabilities,
which are the basic events in the success tree model. A sensitivity analysis is then performed to
check the affect of the inputs from each expert to the final results.
The inputs from different experts are aggregated by a linear opinion pool approach with equal
weight, shown by Clemen and Winkler (Robert T. Clemen 1999). The result is the average of the
values from all experts.
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np(C,)= Z wipi(C,)
i=
(3-1)
p = the proliferator success probability
CS= the safeguard cost
wi= the weighting factor; in this case wi = 1
Because the reference points on the range of the variable M and C have been defined prior the
questionnaire during the first interview, the estimates of uncertainty of measurement and
proliferator success probabilities are at the same reference points of the variables. Therefore, it
provides a better comparison and aggregation of the inputs.
The second telephone interview will then be conducted to present the results to the experts along
with the questions regarding some interesting issues from the analysis. The experts will either
confirm the results or have an opportunity to adjust their inputs to better estimate the system.
Step 8: Finalizing expert inputs
The adjustments and final calculations will be made in this step for the results which are the basic
event probabilities for the safeguard success tree as a function of the relevant factors for the
safeguard system under study.
3.3 Example of the Elicitation Process
Here is the example of the expert elicitation with fictitious results for a neutron counter inside the
MBA2 of an aqueous reprocessing facility.
Safeguard Setup
SMMS Processing Unit
U/Pu/MA/FPs
KMP-2
Pu Nitrate
F 4 KMP-5
Output Accountability Tank (OAT)
KMP-4 KMP-6
Waste
MA/FPs UNitrate
Figure 3-4. Setup on the neutron counter at the Output Accountability Tank (OAT)
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Figure 3-4 and Table 3-5 show the setup and the information about the neutron detector as part of
SMMS in Material Balance Area 2. The neutron detector is used to account for the amount of
neutron radiation from plutonium nitrate in the Output Accountability Tank after the chemical
separation and purification processes. The data from the detector is then compared with the
reference signature and raises alarms in case of differences. This will effectively detect the
proliferator' attempts to divert some amount of plutonium during the earlier processes since the
amount of the plutonium under the detection will not match will the expected value.
Table 3-5. Information about the neutron detector in MBA2 as part of SMMS.
Type: Helium-3 proportional detectors
System: Solution Measurement and Monitoring System (SMMS)
Location: Output Accountability Tank
Material Under Detection: Plutonium in the plutonium nitrate solution
The material under detection by the neutron detector is the plutonium in plutonium nitrate
solution. The approximation of plutonium isotope composition and neutron radiation is shown in
the table below. Please note that the total mass the material under detection (M) in the
questionnaire is the total mass of plutonium inside the detection region.
Table 3-6. Plutonium isotope composition and neutron radiation for a sample at MBA2.
% Isotope Neutron Radiation Neutron Radiation of lkg of
Plutonium Isotope Composition (N/kg.s) Plutonium (N/s)
Pu-238 2.50% 2.67E+06 6.68E+04
Pu-239 55.00% 2.30E+01 1.27E+01
Pu-240 24.00% 1.03E+06 2.47E+05
Pu-241 14.00% 4.94E+01 6.92E+00
Pu-242 4.50% 1.73E+06 7.79E+04
Total 100.00% 5.43E+06 3.92E+05
Interview Questions
The following table shows the example questions and inputs for the neutron counter.
Table 3-7. Example of estimates of the three reference points for the total material mass under detection.
Factor Point on the detectable mass 
range
Point Value (kg)
Mlow I
Total mass of the material Mb, 5
under detection M_
MWO 10
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The cost of the safeguard for the scenario without proliferator tactic is the cost of different
safeguard set-ups that affect the safeguard uncertainty of measurement.
Table 3-8. Example of estimates of the three reference points for the cost of safeguard for no tactic
Safeguard Safeguard modifications (e.g.,
Tactics Estimated Value equipment changes, component
Cost additions, quality improvements,
software interfaces, etc.)
Cmin $0.05M Basic He-3 detector tube
No tactic: Uncertainty of Cbc $0.2M Larger detector, charge amplifierMeasurement
CoPt $1M Multiple highest sensitivity detectors
The cost of the safeguard for the scenario with proliferator tactic is the cost of different safeguard
set-ups that affect the proliferator success probability to elude the safeguard for each specific
tactic.
Table 3-9. Example of estimates of the three reference points for the cost of safeguard for each tactic
Saftguard Safeguard modifications (e.g.,
Tactics Estimated Value equipment changes, component
Cost additions, quality improvements,
software interfaces, etc.)
CA,min $0.05M Basic He-3 detector tube
Tactic A: Dummy material CA,bc $0.2M Larger detector, charge amplifier
CA,opt $1M Multiple highest sensitivity detectors
CB,min $0.05M Basic He-3 detector tube
Tactic B: Compensating material CB,bc $0.2M Larger detector, charge amplifier
CB,opt $1M Multiple highest sensitivity detectors
Cc,min $0.05M Basic detector and cable setup
Tactic C: Hardware modification Cc,bc $0.5M Detector and cable shielding
Cc,opt $2M Movement and tampering sensor
CD,min $0.05M Basic software setup
Tactic D: Software manipulation CD,bc $0.1M Software and data encryption
CD,opt $0.5M Real time authentication and remoteM central server
Questionnaire
Here are the example of inputs and plots of the questionnaire for a neutron counter.
Question I: The neutron counter uncertainty of measurement
The question in the table is asking for the uncertainty of measurement with 95% level of
confidence at three different points of total mass of material under detection (M) and cost of the
safeguard (C). The safeguard cost and the material mass reference points are provided in the table
both for M and C. The following figure shows the plots of the estimates for a comparison.
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Table 3-10. Example of inputs of the uncertainty of measurement as a function of mass and safeguard cost
Safeguard Uncertainty of Measurement (%) with 95% confidence level
Estimated Cost Total Mass M,, = 1kg Total Mass Mbc = 5kg Total Mass Mhigh = 10kg
Cmin = $0.05M 10 4 2.5
Cbc = $0.1M 4 2 1.5
CoPt = $1M 2 1 0.75
12
10
8
-2
03
6-
0
4-
+J
M 2
0-
MInw=1kg
S10
Mb Skg
4
4 .Mhig=1.0kg
2.5 A Cmin = $0.05M
2- - - - - - --- 1.5 E"Cbc=$0.2M"
1 ---- ------ 0.75 COpt=$1M
2 4 6 8 10 12
Total Material Mass - M (kg)
Figure 3-5. Example plot of total material mass versus uncertainty of measurement at three different costs
of safeguard setups for a neutron counter.
Question II: Probability that the proliferator tactics will successfully elude the neutron
counter
Tactic A: Using Dummy Material
The question in the table is asking for the proliferator success probability point estimate and the
error with 95% level of confidence at three different points of the cost of the safeguard. The cost
range and the base case estimates are provided in the table. The following figure shows the plots
of the estimate as a function of the cost of the safeguard.
Table 3-11. Example of inputs of the proliferator success probabilities as a function of safeguard cost
Proliferator success probability of tactic A
Safeguard Estimated
Cost Point Estimate * Error with 95% Level of
Confidence
CA = $0.05M 0.75 0.1
CA,bc = $0.2M 0.4 0.05
CA,opt = $1M 0.2 0.02
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The expected trend of the proliferator success probability versus the cost of the safeguard is
decreasing until it reaches the saturation point where increasing the cost of the safeguard will not
anymore decrease the success probability of the proliferator.
Figure 3-6 shows the example plot of proliferator success probabilities versus the cost of the
safeguard for different proliferator tactics. This plot shows the cost effectiveness of the set up of
the safeguard to prevent the proliferator from eluding the safeguard by each tactic. Note that the
actual comparison of the proliferator success probability will include the probability to elude the
supporting safeguard, such as surveillance camera, seal, etc., as show in the success tree diagram
for the safeguard.
0.95
0.9 Y0.9
0.85
0.8
0.75
0.7
~06
-0.6
0.5
0.4 0.4
*Tactic A
0.3 0 -Tactic B
0.2 s .50.2 A Tactic C
X Tactic D0.1 100 .1 0.1
0.05
0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Cost of the Safeguard ($Millions)
Figure 3-6. Example plot of proliferator success probabilities for different tactics to elude a neutron counter
Then, Figure 3-7 shows the example plot of uncertainty of measurement from different inputs and
the aggregated values using the methods discussed in the earlier section.
4.5 -
Miow=lkg
4 4
4 3.667
; 3.5 '
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2. Mbr5kg
2 Mwgi,=10kg
1.583
1.5 .. - 1.5 *ExpertA
..- *ExpertB
1 A Expert C
A. XAggregated Result
05
D 0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Total Material Mass - M (kg)
Figure 3-7. Example plot of the aggregated inputs for the uncertainty of measurement at base case NC cost
45
3.4 Applications of Results from Expert Elicitation
This section contains discussions of the calculations required to convert of the expert elicitation
results to be used in success tree analyses and possible applications. The methods of transforming
the expert inputs to the probability of the basic events in the success tree are shown in detail.
There are two types of inputs from the expert elicitation. The first one is related to category I
questions, which are for the cases when a proliferator does not attempt any concealment tactic.
The other is related to category II questions, which are for the cases when a proliferator attempts
to use concealment tactics to help elude the safeguard.
1. Uncertainty of Measurement
This input related to the basic event where a proliferator is attempting to elude a safeguard
without any concealment tactic. The uncertainty of measurement must be transformed into the
safeguard probability of failing to detect a diversion for a given amount of diverted mass.
First, a "measurement" type safeguard, such as a neutron counter for material accountancy, is
considered. For the simplest set up, the measurement system consists of a detector and a
processing unit. The system is used to count the total radiation from material inside an
accountability tank for a certain period of time.
Processing Unit
Detector
Material
Accountability Tank
Figure 3-8. "Measurement" type safeguard and material flowing in/out of accountability tank
Let M be the total mass of material inside the accountability tank, and Nm be the number of
counts recorded by the measurement system. The relationship between M and NM is the
following.
Nm =M-a-f -- T
a is the number of activities per unit mass of material
f is the radiation yield per disintegration/fission
C is the absolute detection efficiency
T is the counting time
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Absolute detection efficiency consists of intrinsic efficiency and geometric efficiency. Intrinsic
efficiency of the detector is the probability that the detector registers a count when a particle hit
the detector. Geometric efficiency is the probability that a particle radiated from the material will
reach the detector. Geometric efficiency depends on the relative location of the material to the
detector, geometry, and form of the material.
Because of counting statistical fluctuation and other instrumental variations, the value of NM is
normally distributed with standard deviation aNM, assuming the counting time is long enough.
0.045
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0
0.02
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0
E(Nm) =Mean value of the distribution of NM
Distribution of Nm
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Nm
Figure 3-9. PDF Plot of the number of radiation counts from material mass M
Let Nm be the measured number of counts from a measurement, such that Nm < E(NM). E(NM) is
the expected value or the mean value of NM. And Sm = E(NM) - Nm
E(NM)
0.045 -
0.04 -
0.035 -
0.03 -
,0.025 -
0.02 -
0.015 
- N,
0.01 -
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0m
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NM
Figure 3-10. PDF Plot of the number of radiation counts from material mass M and a measurement Nm
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Using statistical test of significant, the p-value of Nm is the probability that the measurement is
outside of E(NM) m 6 range. For a normal distribution, this probability can be calculated using
the following formula. erf is the error function.
p(N,)=1- erf( m )
UNM
For numerical example, if E(NM) is 50 counts, and UNM= 10, p-value of N. = 30 counts is equal to
0.05, by plugging in 6m= E(NM) - Nm = 20 = 2 GNMin the above equation.
The significant level, or the critical p-value, is the value used to determine whether the
measurement is "statistically significant," or in another word, having a very low probability of
occurring given that the assumption that the known information about the system is correct. Let
this value be denoted by a. If the p-value of the measurement is less than a, then the result of the
measurement is statistically significant, otherwise, it is not. Have a statistically significant means
that there is a high probability that the assumption of the system is incorrect. In the context of the
study, it means that there is a high chance that the amount of material is not equal to the expected
value, and a material diversion has occurred. The popular value of a is 0.05 or 5%.
For example, if a for this case is 0.05 and the measurement result is 10 counts, then the p-value is
0.0027, which is less than 0.05. Therefore, this measurement is statistically significant and
indicates that there is a high probability that some material has been diverted.
Then the question is "what is the probability that a diversion of a certain amount of material or
more has occurred" for a given result of measurement. For this case, the following figure show
the distribution of number of counts when a diversion of MD amount of material has occurred. Let
D = M - MD, and ND is the record counts for material mass D.
E(N0)
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Figure 3-11. PDF Plot of the number of radiation counts from the material when a diversion has occurred
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With the same measurement result as before, Nm, the p-value for this case can be calculated.
Since 6 m,D is smaller than 6 m, therefore, the p-value is higher, which means that there is higher
probability of having a measurement outside of E(ND) m ,D range, assuming that the standard
deviation of measurement remain constant.
If consider the cases where more amount of material has been divert, MD' > MD. By following the
calculation, the p-value is higher. In another word, there is higher probability of having a
measurement of Nm. Therefore, the conclusion can be made that the probability of having MD
amount of material or more diverted is 1 - p(ND)/ 2 , only when Nm < E(ND), for a given result of
measurement, Nm.
For example, if E(ND) = 40 counts for the case that MD amount of material has been diverted, and
result of measurement Nm = 30 counts, then 6 m,D = 10 = N ZUNM-. The p-value for this case is
0.32. Therefore, the probability of having a measurement less than 30 counts and more than 50
counts is 32%. Following the above explanation, given the result of measurement Nm, the
probability of having MD or more amount of material diverted is 1 - (0.32/2) = 0.84, or 84%.
From the above discussion, the probability of having a significant quantity (SQ) or more of
material diverted can be derived as a function of the result of measurement. If the goal of the
safeguard is to detect a diversion when there is 95% or more chance that a diversion of one SQ
amount of material has occurred, then the safeguard should be set to signal an alarm with the
measurement is lower than the amount of measurement corresponding to having 95% or more
SQ quantity diverted.
Using the prior example, if the number of counts when an SQ amount of material has been
diverted is NsQ and E(NsQ) = 30 counts. Then the plot of the probability that more than one SQ
quantity of material has been diverted versus the result measurement can be calculated.
Pr(M, > MSQ INM < NsQ)=1- p(Nmi)/2= erf( 'm,i,SQ )/2
NSQ
0.9 -
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0.7
c 0.6
IA
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0
Figure 3-12. PDF Plot of probability that more than 1 SQ has been diverted versus measurement result Nm~
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From the plot, the corresponding point where the probability of more than 1 SQ has been diverted
is 95%, or 0.95, is when the measurement result is between 13 and 14 counts. Therefore, if the
result of a measurement is lower or equal to 13 counts then there is 95% or more chance that 1SQ
amount of material has been diverted.
The above discussion provides a method to identify the significant level or the limit of
measurement at which a safeguard will signal an alarm. This limit then can be used to derive the
probability of detecting a diversion for a given diverted amount per attempt.
Using the prior notations, where a proliferator attempts to divert MD amount of material from the
total mass M, the amount left after the diversion is D = M - MD and the expected number of
counts is E(ND). The standard deviation of ND distribution is derived from the expert judgments
of the percentage uncertainty of measurement with 95% level of confidence. Since ND is normally
distributed, 95% level of confidence corresponds to 2 standard deviations. Therefore, GND is equal
to a half of the uncertainty. Let U be the percentage of uncertainty given by the experts, and u be
the uncertainty of ND-
u=U 
-E(ND)
Then, o- =
"2
If the significant level is 0.05, then the limit in the unit of number of counts is NL = E(Nm) - 2 GNM-
Finally, the probability of failing to detect the diversion is the probability that the measurement is
higher than the limit value. The p-values in the following equation are for the distribution of ND.
Pr (fail to detect a diversion of MD) =1- P(NL) if NL E(ND)
2
p(NL) if NL >E(ND)
2
The second type of safeguard is the "detection" type, such as a portal monitor system. The
simplest detection system is considered, it contains a detector and a processing unit. The system
is used to detect and count the total radiation of interest from a sample or a person going through
this detection system for a certain period of time.
The analysis for this type of safeguard is similar to the one in the earlier discussion. However, the
number of counts by the detector when there is no material diversion is the counts of background
radiation. When there is a diversion attempt, the total amount of radiation is the sum of radiations
from the background and the material.
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Processing Unit
Detector
U ILJ
Diverted Material
Figure 3-13. "Detection" type safeguard and diverted material going through the detection region
Let ND be the number of counts for the radiation from diverted material and NB be the number of
counts for the background radiation. Assuming that the background radiation is constant for the
period during the calibration and the actual detection, the total number of counts is NT = NB + ND-
0.25
E(NB) E(NT)
0.2 Distribution of NE.
0.15 Distribution of NT
0.1
0.05 % N,
0~
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Counts
Figure 3-14. PDF Plot of the number of radiation counts from the diverted material and background
The standard deviation of NT, aNT, can be approximate from the expert judgments of the
uncertainty of measurement with 95% confidence level at the background level of radiation,
assuming that ND is low compared to NB.
If the significant level is 0.05 then the limit in the unit of number of counts is NL = E(NB )+ 23NB-
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The probability of failing to detect the diversion is the probability that the measurement is lower
than the limit value. The p-values in the following equation are for the distribution of NT.
Pr (fail to detect a diversion of MD) =1- P(NL; if NL E(NT)
2
p(N if NL < E(NT)
2
2. Proliferator diversion success probability
This input related to the basic event where a proliferator is attempting to elude a safeguard by
using some concealment tactics. Proliferator diversion success probability is already in the form
of the basic event probability and does not require any transformation. Depending on tactic
choice, this probability depends on the cost of the components of the safeguard that help prevent
the tactic to succeed.
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Chapter 4 Facility Safeguard Evaluation
For this chapter, the Rokkasho reprocessing plant is used for a demonstration of the procedures
and methodology of safeguard scheme evaluation presented in this framework.
4.1 Rokkasho Reprocessing Facility
The Rokkasho reprocessing facility is a nuclear reprocessing plant owned by Japan Nuclear Fuel
Limited located in the village of Rokkasho in northeast Aomori Prefecture, Japan. Since this is
the only operating commercial reprocessing plant outside of nuclear weapon state, the IAEA has
been using this facility as a test site for the advance safeguard instrumentations and schemes.
Table 4-1. Specifications of Reference Industrial-scale Reprocessing Plants in Japan (IAEA 1980)
Topic Value
Process Chop/leach solvent extraction
Design capacity 2x3 t/d
Plant availability 200-300 d/a
Commercial program 1000-1500 t U/a
Maximum fuel burnup 40 GW d/t
Fuel cooling time I a (minimum)
Mode of operation Continuous on shift
Spent fuel reception buffer storage 2000 t U
Uranyl nitrate buffer 100 m3a(at 450 g U/1)
Plutonium nitrate buffer storage 2 m3 (at 250 g Pu/l)
HA waste concentration storage 3600 m3 (5 a)
MA aqueous waste storage 10000 m3 (5 a)
MA organic waste interim storage 350 m3
Cladding and structural material 0.5 m3 /t U
Ion exchange resins and iodine absorbers 1.5 m3/a
Off-gas and exhaust air filter 500 m3 /a
Pu-contaminated material, engineering I m3 /t U
wastes and decontamination materials
Table 4-2 shows the list of different types of material inside the reprocessing facility separated by
material balance areas.
Table 4-2. Material flow in each material balance area
MBA1 MBA2 MBA3 MBA4 MBA5
Spent LWR Fuel Spent Fuel Hulls, Cladding, Pu Nitrate, U MOX, U0 3
Assemblies, Solvent, Pu Waste from Nitrate, MOX
Chopped, and Nitrate, U Nitrate, Chemical
Solvent U0 3  Separation Process
I and Denitration
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Nuclear Reprocessing Facility (Aqueous- Oxide Fuel)
'MBA1
Enter -
Exit
KMP-10 KMP-11
Exit Exit
Figure 4-1. Diagram showing the processes and material flow inside Rokkasho reprocessing facility
(PNNL 2007)
MBA1 Spent Fuel Storage Area
Material: Spent LWR Fuel
Isotopic Composition of Uranium in 4 Percent Enriched Fresh Fuel and in Spent Light Water
Reactor Fuel, Burnup 45 MWd/kgHM, in percentage.
Table 4-3. Isotope composition of fresh and spend fuel (IAEA-TECDOC-1535 2007)
Isotope Fresh Fuel Spent Fuel
Trace U 0.04 0.02
U-235 4 0.68
U-236 0 0.52
U-238 96 93.05
Pu isotopes 0 0.99
FP 0 4.62
Non-PU TRU 0 0.095
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MBA2
U/Pu/MA/FPs
Chemical
Separation
KMP-C
Pu Nitrate U Nitrate
Pu UPurification U DenitrationPurification P
PuNitrate KMP-D U Nitrate KMP-E KMPF'
KMP-5 
_ _ _ _ _ KMP-6 UO3
MBA4 MBA5 KMP-7
Co- MOX J MOX UOX
Denitration KOP-8 Storage Storage
KMP-H KMP-I KMP-J
MBA2 Reprocessing Area
Material: Spent Fuel Solvent, Plutonium Nitrate, Uranium Nitrate
The PUREX (Plutonium Uranium Recovery by EXtraction) solvent extraction process separates
the uranium and plutonium from the fission products. After adjustment of the acidity, the
resultant aqueous solution is equilibrated with an immiscible solution of tri-n-butyl phosphate
(TBP) in refined kerosene. The TBP solution preferentially extracts uranium and plutonium
nitrates, leaving fission products and other nitrates in the aqueous phase. Then, chemical
conditions are adjusted so that the plutonium and uranium are re-extracted into a fresh aqueous
phase. Normally, two solvent extraction cycles are used for the separation; the first removes the
fission products from the uranium and plutonium, while the second provides further
decontamination. Uranium and plutonium are separated from one another in a similar second
extraction operation. The plutonium composition is shown below (IAEA 1980).
Table 4-4. Isotope composition of plutonium in the chemical separation area
Plutonium Isotope Isotope Percentage
Pu-238 2.5%
Pu239 55%
Pu240 24%
Pu241 14%
Pu242 4.5%
MBA3 Waste Process and Storage Area
Material: Spent High Level Waste (HLW) and Low Level Waste (LLW)
Highly radioactive liquid waste, containing undissolved particles from the head-end process,
concentrated fission products, and medium activity liquid waste are received in the waste-
treatment area. They are further concentrated by evaporation and may be mixed together prior to
being introduced to a vitrification process in which they are mixed into molten glass.
The LLW is the waste from the co-denitration process and it does not contain the radioactive
materials, which are fission products and minor actinides.
MBA4 Co-denitration Area
Material: Spent MOX Powder, MOX Canister
Plutonium nitrate and Uranium nitrate are mixed and go through co-denitration to produce mixed
oxide (MOX) powder. These powder is then stored in canisters.
MBA5 Product Storage Area
Material: MOX Canister, UOX Bottle
MOX canisters and UOX bottles from earlier process are stored in this area for shipment.
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4.2 Safeguard Details of the Facility
Figure 4-2. Diagram showing the safeguard systems inside Rokkasho reprocessing facility
(S. J. Johnson 2001)
The safeguard systems shown in Figure 4-2 and in the following discussions are the actual
safeguard systems inside Rokkasho reprocessing facility (PNNL 2007).
MBA1: Feed Storage & Disassembly Area
This is the area where the spent fuel assemblies arrive at the facility. The fuel assemblies are
transport in a cask to the spent fuel pool. The transferring process and monitoring the spent fuel
pool is done by the Integrated Spent Fuel Verification System (ISVS). Within MBAl, the
transferring of the fuel elements to the fuel chopper is monitoring by Integrated Head-end
Verification System (IHVS). Then the left over material such as hulls and cladding are verified
for nuclear material by Rokkasho Hulls Measurement System (RHMS).
Integrated Spent Fuel Verification System (ISVS)
ISVS verifies the unloading and receipt of spent fuel assemblies and maintains continuity of
knowledge of the inventory using aerial surveillance and radiation monitoring of passages.
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Components Safeguard Location Material Functionality
Surveillance Walls above the Spent fuel Ensure the surveillance of spent fuel
Camera storage ponds assembly storage
Underwater Spent fuel Ensure that the cask are leavingOS Unloading bays empty and the radiation detectors areCamera assernbly not being shielded
Miniature
Gamma Ray and Provide differentiation of whether theNeutron Detector Unloading Spent fuel spent fuel is going in or out and if it is(MiniGRAND) - GRS canals assembly a shipment of poison rods and channel
Chamber/Plastic boxes (only gamma but no neutron)
Scintillator
Miniature Provide differentiation of whether theGamma Ray and Unloading Spent fuel spent fuel is going in or out and if it isNeutron Detector NC canals assembly a shipment of poison rods and channel(MiniGRAND) - boxes (only gamma but no neutron)He-3 Tubes
Integrated Head End Verification System (IHVS)
IHVS maintains continuity of knowledge of the spent fuel as it moves through the mechanical
feeding cells to the shear cells and provides the spent fuel IDs.
Components Type of Location Material FunctionalitySafeguard
Spent fuel Ensure the surveillance of spent fuelSurveillance OS mechanical cell Spent fuel assemblies as they move through the
Camera lines assembly mechanical feeding cells to the shearing
cells
Spent fuel Spent fuel Provide spent fuel IDs as they are
ID Camera ID mechanical cell
lines assembly brought into feeding cells
Camera
Radiation
Detector Spent fuel Spent fuel Monitor the passage of the spent fuel
(CRD) - GRS mechanical cell senfl assemblies in feeding cells and shearing
Xenon lines assembly cells
Ionization
Chamber
Camera
Radiation Spent fuel Monitor the passage of the spent fuelDetector NC mechanical cell Spent fuel assemblies in feeding cells and shearing(CRD) - 4atm. lines assembly cells
He3 Neutron
Detector
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Rokkasho Hulls Measurement System (RHMS)
RHMS provides semi-quantitative assay of the nuclear material content in the leached hulls and
end pieces of the spent fuel assemblies.
Components Type of Location Material Functionality
Safeguard
Leached Detects the passive neutrons fromNeutron curium in the hulls to approximate the
Detector NC Hliels material content using Cm/Pu/U ratio in
end pieces the dissolver solution
Surveillance
OS Camera| Underwater
Camera
Miniature
Gamma Ray and
Neutron Detector
GRS I(MiniGRAND) -
Ionization
Chamber/Plastic
Scintillator
Miniature
Gamma Ray and
NC iNeutron Detector
(MiniGRAND) -
He-3 Tubes
Surveillance
Camera
I DCamera
Camera Radiation
Detector (CRD) -[GR SXenon ionization
Chamber
Camera Radiation
Detector (CRD) -
NC 4atm He3
Neutron Detector
M BA 1
Enter --- KiKMP-1
Figure 4-3. Diagram showing the safeguard systems inside MBA1
MBA2: Reprocessing Area
In this area, the material solution from MBAl is verified by the Solution Measurement and
Monitoring System (SMMS), which is the main system for verifying solution level, volume and
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~~1
Reprocessing
Area
Waste Storage
RHMS Neutron Counter
density in most of the solution processes in the MBA2. Both the waste stream and Plutonium
Nitrate stream are randomly verified by Automatic Sampling Authentication System (ASAS)
In the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant, the separated uranium is purified and concentrated, and then
approximately 99% of the uranyl nitrate is transferred to a conversion process - all within MBA2.
After conversion to U0 3, it is transferred to a product- storage area in MBA5. The remaining
uranyl nitrate is routed directly to the co-denitration process, which is the uranium- plutonium
mixed-oxide (MOX) powder-production process in MBA4.
Solution Measurement and Monitoring System (SMMS)
SMMS is an in-tank measurement system used for the determination of solution level, volume
and density. The technology is based on the bubbling of a controlled stream of gas through dip
tubes installed at various depths within the solution and in the vapor space above the solution.
The solution measurement data is obtained by determining the differential pressure between dip
tubes and a specified time, and applying a tank calibration equation.
There are two types of SMMS. Type 1 (SMMS- 1) is used to measure and monitor the solution
levels, volumes and densities in the most safeguards significant vessels in the main process.
SMMS- 1 uses high-accuracy, independent, and authenticated pressure measurement devices in
the 12 most important process vessels. A volume measurement uncertainty of ±0.05% was
achieved during commissioning. Type 2(SMMS-2) is used to measure and monitor the levels,
volumes and densities in vessels of less safeguards significance in the main process. SMMS-2
uses mainly industrial pressure measurement devices in 80 process vessels. These can be pressure
or temperature sensors, as well as neutron detectors mounted on the extractors in the main
process.
The data collected from the detector are sent to the main processing unit which uses Solution
Monitoring Software (SMS). SMS is a highly developed piece of software used routinely by the
IAEA inspectors in the on-site inspector office, and includes configuration, preprocessing and
evaluation functions. It automatically analyzes the data from the sensors (pressure, temperature,
neutron detectors).
Components Safeguard Location Material Functionality
Process vessels / Material Measure and monitor solution levels,Electromano meter PM Accountancy Solution volume, and density
tanks
Temperature Process vessels / Material Measure material solution
Sensor HI Accountancy Solution temperature for accountancytanks
Process vessels / Material Measure material solution neutronNeutron Detector NC Accountancy Solution radiation for accountancy
tanks
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Automatic Sampling Authentication System (ASAS)
ASAS is an automatic system that authenticates the random taking and transferring of the sample
from operator process sampling benches to the joint use of IAES/State Inspector On-site
Laboratory (OSL). The sample of plutonium nitrate going to MBA4 is verified via Hybrid K-
Edge Densitometry (HKED). On the other hand, the sample of High Active Liquid Waste
(HALW) from the chemical separation process is analyzed via Pu(VI) Spectrophotometric
method for plutonium and Isotope Dilution Mass Spectroscopy (DMS) for uranium.
Components Type of Location Material FunctionalitySafeguard
Hybrid K-Edge Nitrate Stream Destructive analysis to verify the
Densitometry DA toPMBu4 Pu Nitrate amount and isotope composition
(HKED) of plutonium in the solvent stream
Pu(VI) High Active Destructive analysis to verify the
Spectrophotometric DA Waste Stream Liquid amount of plutonium in the wasteWaste stream
Isotope Dilution High Active Destructive analysis to verify the
Mass Spectroscopy DA Waste Stream Liquid amount of uranium in the waste
(DMS) Waste stream
Electromanometer o and
............. - onitoring Svstpni
Temperature
Sensor
[ C Neutron Detector
Spent Fuel Storage -
KMP-4
Waste Storage
Automatic Sampling
Authentication System
Hybrid K-Edge
Densitometry (HKED)
Pu(VI) Spectrophotometric A
Isotope Dilution Mass
Spectroscopy (IDMS)
N NII
mical
ration
KMP-C
U Nitrate s
ication U Denitration
KMP-E KMP-F
Figure 4-4. Diagram showing the safeguard systems inside MBA2
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MBA3: Waste Storage Area
Highly radioactive liquid waste, containing undissolved particles from the head-end process,
concentrated fission products, and medium activity liquid waste are received in the waste-
treatment area. They are further concentrated by evaporation and may be mixed together prior to
being introduced to a vitrification process in which they are mixed into molten glass. After
accountancy measurements have been completed for consideration of termination of safeguards,
canisters of solidified vitrified waste are transferred to a long-term storage area.
The total quantity of plutonium going into waste in a reprocessing plant is typically less that 0.5
percent of the total throughput, with concentrations in the milligram per liter (parts per million)
range.
Vitrified Canister Assay System (VCAS)
VCAS provides semi-quantitative assay of the nuclear material content in the vitrified waste
before being transferred to measured discards for termination of safeguards, and verifies that the
nuclear material has been effectively vitrified and practically irretrievable.
Component Safeguard Location Material Functionality
Verify the amount of Pu and U from
collecting neutron emitted by Curium-
Fission After Vitrified 244 calculated with the composition
Chambers NC Vitrification Cell Waste ratio and the ratio of thermal/fastCanister neutrons provides verification that the
canister does not contain aqueous
solution
Ionization Route to and Waste Confirm the direction of transferring of
Chambers GRS Vitrificion Cell Canister the canister
Surveillance Route to and Waste Ensure the surveillance of the waste
Camera OS from the Canister canister transfer to and from theVitrification Cell vitrification cell
Route to and Waste
ID Camera ID from the Provide ID of the waste canister
Vitrification Cell Canister
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Waste Crate Assay System (WCAS)
WCAS provides semi-quantitative assay of the nuclear material content in the low active waste
crates.
Component Safeguard Location Material Functionality
Verify the amount of Pu and U from
Waste collecting neutron emitted by Curium-He-3 Detector* NC Waste Storage Crate 244 calculated with the composition
ratio based on the building origin of the
waste crate
Surveillance OS Waste Storage Waste Ensure the surveillance of the waste
Camera OS WseSoae Crate crate transfer
ID Camera ID Waste Storage Wate Provide ID of the waste crate
He-3 Detector*: The detectors are distributed in different arrays (thermal, fast, shielded, and not
shielded). This distribution allows for the estimation of the thermal effect of the matrix of the
waste, and the measurement of wastes containing fission products.
Waste Drum Assay System (WDAS)
WDAS provides semi-quantitative assay of the nuclear material content in the Low Active Waste
Drums from the mixed oxide (MOX) conversion process, having no fission products.
The system is based on the IAEA standard gamma spectrometry verification system (HRGS with
portable Inspector Multichannel Analyzer). The system includes a high-resolution germanium
detector, mounted on a trolley; a portable IMCA; and FRAM and ISOCS software.
Measurement time is around 15 minutes and the
plutonium.
expected detection limit is below 1 g of
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Components Type of Location Material Functionality
____________Safeguard ________ _____ _________________
Low Active Waste Verify the material content in the LowHPGe Detector GRS Waste Drums Crate Active Waste Drums from MOX
Conversion Process
Chopping / Dissolution
KMP-3
MBA3
Proc
I' StO,
Exit
-- I
Chemical Separation
Co-denitration
WCAS/WDs
Figure 4-5. Diagram showing the safeguard systems inside MBA3
MBA4: Co-Denitration Area
The process of producing uranium-plutonium mixed-oxide powder at the Rokkasho Reprocessing
Plant starts with the mixing of uranyl and plutonium-nitrate solutions. The resulting mixture is
dried and calcined to produce oxide powder that is then milled to a uniform particle size.
Processes used in other countries convert the uranium and plutonium solutions to oxide powders
separately prior to mixing. The ASAS takes the solution and power sample for a verification by
destructive analysis as explained in MBA3 section.
Plutonium Inventory Measurement System (PIMS)
PIMS provides continuous monitoring of the flow of MOX powder and measurement of
plutonium in the glove boxes through the process lines to ensure that the operations are as
declared.
Up to 8 detectors/amplifier units are connected to a "hub unit." There are 30 hubs linked by a
high-speed fiber optic loop to the data acquisition computer (DAC) which timestamps the data.
The DAC calculates the count rate information and transmits that data to a data processing
computer (DPC), which calculates the plutonium and uranium distribution throughout the glove
boxes.
Components Type of Location Material FunctionalitySafeguard
Monitor plutonium and uranium
Helium-3 MOX Process MOX distribution throughout the gloved
Neutron NC Glove Boxes Powder boxes and provide the total inventory
Detector using isotopic composition from the
feed solution
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GRS
ID
Fission Chambers
Ionization
Chambers
Surveillance
Camera
IDCamera He-3 Detector
Surveillance
Camera
IDCamera
HPGe Detector
Temporary Canister Verification System (TCVS)
TCVS provides inventory measurements of the plutonium in the MOX Temporary Canister
Storage. The system is designed to determine the number of MOX temporary containers that are
present "left," "mid," and "right" and the amount of plutonium mass by "known alpha" analysis
in the 3 storage pits in each glove box of lines A and B. The isotopic composition is provided by
the operator, and later verified by comparison to analyses of samples taken from the solution
feed.
Components Type of Location Material FunctionalitySafeguard
Neutron
coincidence MOX MOX Monitor plutonium in the MOX
based system NC Temporary Powder temporary canister storage
(He-3 Canister Storage
detectors)
Pu Purification U Purification
. .- ----
Helium-3Neutron
Detector
......----- -- - -- .......
Waste Storage
HybridK-Edge
Densitometry (HKED)
Pu(VI) Spectrophotometric
Isotope Dilution Mass
Spectroscopy (IDMS)
Pu Nitrate KMP-D U Nitrate
KMP-5KMP-6
MBA4
Denitration WIP-8
KM AP -9
KMP-H
- - - - - - - - - -
utoati Sapig
Figure 4-6. Diagram showing the safeguard systems inside MBA4
MBA5: Product Storage Area
In the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant, canisters of uranium-oxide product are received for storage
from the Conversion Process in MBA2 and canisters of MOX product are received from the
MOX conversion process in MBA4.
Since this MBA is a storage area containing previously verified containers of product material,
there is no need for new measurements. The integrity of the measurements performed in MBA4 is
maintained by surveillance and radiation monitoring systems to detect movements of containers
and materials within and out of the facility. In other plants, containers used for long-term storage
could be sealed with tamper- indicating seals.
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DA]
DA
MOX Storage
Neutron
coincidence
based system
(He-3 detectors)
I
Uranium Bottle Verification System (UBVS)
UBVS verifies the transfer of the U03 product before it is placed under C/S in the U03 product
storage. It comprises of CdZnTe detector connected to a standard IMCA with MGAU software
(IMCC), rack (provided by the operator) for holding the bottle during measurement, and flat
weighing scale.
After weighing, the operator stores the U0 3 bottles in one of the storage bays. These bays are
under Uranium Storage Containment and Surveillance (USCS) surveillance. Periodically, and
after a sufficient number of bottles have been produced and stored, an IAEA verification is
scheduled.
Components Typer Location Material Functionality
____________Safeguard Loain MtrlFucoait
CdZnTe GRS Before U0 3  UO3Bottle Verify U0 3 enrichment before it is
Detector Product Storage 0 placed in the product storage
Flat BeforeU0 3  U0 3  Verify U0 3 bottle weight before itWeighing WI Product Bottle is placed in the product storageScale Storage
Uranium Storage Containment and Surveillance (USCS)
USCS applies dual C/S on the uranium product storage, in order to reduce or eliminate the
requirements for re-verification of U03 bottles at the PIV.
Compoents Type ofComponents Safeguard Location Material Functionality
Surveillance Entranceof UO3 Ensure the surveillance of U0 3 bottles
Camera OS Storage Bay U0 3 Bottle from the exit of the measurement roomto the entrance of each storage bay
Entranceof UO3 Seal is applied on the transfer machineMetal Seal SL Storage Bay 3  U0 3 Bottle rail when a storage bay is full or no
longer in use
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Improved Plutonium Canister Assay System (iPCAS)
iPCAS provides quantitative verification of the MOX product in canisters, before they are placed
in the MOX storage under dual containment and surveillance (C/S).
Components Safeguard Location Material Functionality
Array of He-3 Before MOX MOX Verify the quantity of nuclear material
Tubes* NC Product Storage Canister using isotopic composition of MOXproduct
HPGe detector GRS Before MOX MOX Verify the isotopic composition ofProduct Storage Canister MOX product
ID Camera ID Before MOX MOX Provide MOX canister IDProduct Storage Canister
Precision Load Before MOX MOX Verify the weight of the MOX canister.
Cell WI Product Storage Canister IPCL has accuracy better than
±0.042%.
He-3 tubes*: 2 concentric arrays of helium-3 tubes, one under-moderated, the other over-
moderated, provide correction for the moisture content.
Directional Canister Passage Detectors (DCPD)
DCPD monitors the transfer of the MOX product canisters, after they have been verified with the
iPCAS and until they reach the MOX storage where they are put under dual C/S.
Component Safeguard Location Material Functionality
Neutron Path from MOX Verify nuclear material inside MOX
Detector NC iCKS to the Canister canister before it is placed in theMOX Storage storage
Surveillance Path from MOX Provide the surveillance of MOX
Camera OS iPCAS to the Canister canister transfer carts in the corridorsMOX Storage leading to each of the MOX storages
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MOX Storage C/S System (MSCS)
MSCS applies dual C/S on the MOX product storage area after verification by iPCAS and
transfer under DCPD monitoring, in order to reduce or eliminate re-verification at the PIV.
Compoents Type ofComponents Location Material FunctionalitySafeguard
Above Storage
Surveillance Pits and Cart MOX Ensure the surveillance of MOX
Camera Unloading Canister canister in the storage pits
Position
Transfer Cart MOX Seal is applied to the transfer cart back
Door Canister door
Neutron Transfer Cart MOX Verify nuclear material in MOX
Detector NC Unloading Canister canister before it is unloaded into thePosition storage
Transfer Cart MOX
ID Camera ID Unloading Canister Provide MOX canister ID
Position anite
[C Neutron Detector
] Surveillance
Camera
Co-denitration
Array of He-3
Tubes*
GRS HPGe detector
WD IDCamera
Precision Load
I Cell
Surveillance
Camera
MetalSeal jSL
Neutron Detector N C
IDCamera ID CdZnTe Detector GRS
Flat Weighing
Sea
05
SL
Surveillance
Camera
MetalSeat
Exit Exit
Figure 4-7. Diagram showing the safeguard systems inside MBA5
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4.3 Diversion Scenarios
After the safeguard scheme for each material balance area has been identified, then the list of all
of the possible diversion scenarios can be derived by checking the key measurement points inside
the facility.
For a proliferator to succeed diverting SNM, the following must be accomplished.
1. Remove the material from the process without detection
2. Take the diverted material out of the facility
In the following section, the possible diversion scenarios in each MBA are identified along with
the type material being diverted and the safeguard in place to detect these diversions. All of the
key measurement points are considered. Each diversion will be given specific diversion scenario
ID for use in analyses following this section. The diagram helps providing the clarification of
where the diversion scenarios can occur.
Action 1: Obtain material within the facility
For this action, there are two types of methods that the proliferator can do.
1. Direct diversion of material from a specific location in the facility
2. Indirect diversion where the proliferator modify the facility processes in order to redirect
the flow of material in the facility to the location where diversion is easier
The first method can be done at all of the processes and transfer points inside the facilities
depending on the accessibility of the location of the process. The second method must be done at
the processes where there is a change of form of the material of there are more than one different
streams of products out of the processes.
MBA1
This is the first area of the reprocessing facility. The material in this area is the spent fuel
assemblies, which contain radioactive materials. Therefore, these materials are more difficult for
the proliferator to handle. Also the spent fuel assemblies can be easily counted, thus the
proliferator is required to use more sophisticated tactics in order to divert these fuel assemblies.
For the location options, the proliferator can choose to divert the material during the transfer and
storage in the spent fuel pool. One additional tactic that can be done is to modify the dissolution
process or leave some of the fuel assemblies out of the dissolution process to send extra amount
of spent fuel down the waste stream and then make the diversion attempt there.
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Figure 4-8. Diagram showing the possible diversion scenarios in MBA1
Table 4-5. List of possible material diversion scenarios in MBA I
Scenario Scenario Material Preventing SafeguardsID
Divert a spent fuel assembly Surveillance Camera (ISVS - OS)
Sl- during the transfer from the arrival Spent fuel Miniature Gamma Ray and Neutron
of the assemblies to the spent fuel assembly Detector (ISVS - GRS/NC)
pool
Surveillance Camera (ISVS - OS)
S1-2 Divert a spent fuel assembly from Spent fuel Under Water Camera (ISVS - OS)the spent fuel pool assembly Miniature Gamma Ray and Neutron
Detector (ISVS - GRS/NC)
Surveillance Camera (IHVS -OS)Divert a spent fuel assembly Spent fuel ID Camera (IHVS - ID)Sl-3 during the transfer from the spent assembly Camera Radiation Detector (CRD)fuel pool to the fuel chopper (IHVS - GRS/NC)
Divert chopped spent fuel Chopped Surveillance Camera (IHVS -OS)
Sl-4 elements inside the mechanical spent fuel Camera Radiation Detector (CRD)
shearing cell element (IHVS - GRS/NC)
Redirect the chopped fuel
elements from being dissolve to Chopped
Sl-5 the hulls waste stream, then divert spent fuel Surveillance Camera (IHVS -OS)the material during the transfer element Neutron Detector (RHMS - NC)
between chopping cell to the hulls
storage
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MBA2
This is the main process of the facility and since the material inside this MBA is in form of liquid,
it is easier for the proliferator to divert at any desired amount. After the separation process, the
products are in the form of plutonium and uranium nitrate, which are easier to handle and more
attractive in term of nuclear weapon construction.
Figure 4-9. Diagram showing the possible diversion scenarios in MBA2
Table 4-6. List of possible material diversion scenarios in MBA2
Scenario Scenario Material Preventing Safeguards
ID ____________
Divert spent fuel solvent during Electromanometer (SMMS - PM)
S2-1 the transfer between dissolution Spent fuel Temperature Sensor (SMMS -HI)process to chemical separation solvent Neutron Detector (SMMS - NC)
process
Electromanometer (SMMS - PM)
S2-2 Divert spent fuel during the Spent fuel Temperature Sensor (SMMS -HI)
chemical separation process solvent Neutron Detector (SMMS - NC)
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Scenario Scenario Material Preventing SafeguardsID
Modify the organic or complexing Pu Nitrate Electromanometer (SMMS - PM)
agents to redirect more plutonium in waste Temperature Sensor (SMMS -HI)
S2-3 into the waste stream, then divert inrast Neutron Detector (SMMS - NC)
the material stream during the ( A FPs) Pu(VI) Spectrophotometric (ASAS -
transfer to waste storage DA)
Electromanometer (SMMS - PM)
Divert plutonium during the Temperature Sensor (SMMS -HI)S2-4 plutonium purification process Pu Nitrate Neutron Detector (SMMS - NC)
Hybrid K-Edge Densitometry (ASAS -
DA)
S2-5 Divert uranium during the uranium U Nitrate Electromanometer (SMMS - PM)purification process Temperature Sensor (SMMS -HI)
Electromanometer (SMMS - PM)
Divert plutonium during the Temperature Sensor (SMMS -HI)
S2-6 transfer between purification Pu Nitrate Neutron Detector (SMMS - NC)
process and co-denitration process Hybrid K-Edge Densitometry (ASAS -
DA)
MBA3
This MBA contains the waste processes and storage. The materials in here are mostly
structure/cladding and waste from the separation processes. This is the least attractive place for a
diversion unless the proliferator modifies the process to divert more plutonium into the waste
stream.
MBA3
Pr
Si
Figure 4-10. Diagram showing the possible diversion scenarios in MBA3
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Table 4-7. List of possible material diversion scenarios in MBA3
Scenario Scenario Material Preventing Safeguards
ID
Divert high level active waste High level Fission Chambers (VCAS - NC)
S3-1 before and after vitrification cells active Surveillance Camera (VCAS - OS)
in the waste storage waste ID Camera (VCAS - ID)
Low level He-3 Detector (WCAS - NC)
Divert low level active waste Lotlve Surveillance Camera (WCAS - OS)
crates from the waste storage active ID Camera (WCAS - ID)
waste HPGe Detector (WDAS - GRS)
MBA4
This MBA contains the co-denitration process to create the MOX fuel. There are various
processes that change the form of the material and combining plutonium and uranium from
different stream. This provides an opportunity for a diversion, since the uncertainty for material
accountancy will be high.
Pu Purification U Purification
Waste Storage
Figure 4-11. Diagram showing the possible diversion scenarios in MBA4
Table 4-8. List of possible material diversion scenarios in MBA4
Scenario Scenario Material Preventing Safeguards
ID
S4-1 Divert MOX powder during the MOX He-3 Neutron Detector (PIMS - NC
co-denitration process powder e N
S4-2 Divert MOX canister from the MOX He-3 Neutron Detectors (TCVS - NCMOX temporary canister storage Canister
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MBA5
This is the last area of the facility before shipping the product out of the facility. The MBA
contains the storage of MOX canisters and UOX bottles.
Exit Exit
Figure 4-12. Diagram showing the possible diversion scenarios in MBA5
Table 4-9. List of possible material diversion scenarios in MBA5
Scenario Scenario Material Preventing SafeguardsID
Array of He-3 Tubes (iPCAS - NC)
HPGe Detector (iPCAS - GRS)
S5-1 Divert MOX Canister during the MOX ID Camera (iPCAS - ID)transfer to the MOX storage Canister Precision Load Cells (iPCAS -WI)
Neutron Detector (DCPD -NC)
Surveillance Camera (DCPD - OS)
Surveillance Camera (MSCS - OS)
S5-2 Divert MOX Canister from the MOX Metal Seal (MSCS - SL)MOX storage Canister Neutron Detector (MSCS - NC)
ID Camera (MSCS (ID)
S5-3 Divert U0 3 Bottle during the UC3 Bottle dZnTe Detector (UBVS - GRS)transfer to UOX Storage Flat Weighing Scale (UBVS - WI)
S5-4 Divert U0 3 Bottle from the UOX UO3 Bottle Surveillance Camera (USCS - OS)
storage Metal Seal (USCS - SL)
Action 2: Take the diverted material out of the facility
For this action to be success the proliferator must elude the surveillance system, environmental
sampling and the portal monitoring system. The success probability depends on the type of the
material.
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Table 4-10. List of possible material diversion scenarios to take diverted material out of the facility
Scenario Scenario Material Preventing SafeguardsID
STO-1 Spent Fuel
STO-2 Pu Nitrate
STO-3 U Nitrate
STO-4 Take the diverted MOX Powder Optical Surveillance (Facility - OS)
material out of the Environmental Sampling (ES)
STO-5 facility MOX Canister Portal Monitoring (PTM)
STO-6 U Bottle
STO-7 HALW
STO-8 LALW
With the list of the possible scenarios and the associated safeguards, this is the background
information needed for the expert elicitation of the probability of the basic events that will be
used in the success tree model analysis.
4.4 Probabilistic Analysis
For each scenario in Section 4.3 , the success tree can be built depending on the safeguards that
are in place to detect that diversion and the tactics that the proliferator will try to use. From an
expert elicitation process shown in Chapter 3, the basic event probabilities in the tree can be
derived for the set of safeguards in the facility.
There are three variables for a material diversion attempt
1. The scenario: the proliferator must choose the scenario of the diversion, which contains
the type of material to be diverted, the location of the attempt, and the method of
obtaining the material.
2. The tactic: the proliferator must decide on the tactics that he/she will use to help elude the
safeguards in place to detect the diversion attempt.
3. The amount of material diverted per attempt: the proliferator must select the amount of
material that will be diverted during one of the attempts. The goal of the proliferator is to
choose a large enough amount to reach the significant quantity in acceptable time frame,
while small enough to have high percentage chance of eluding the safeguards.
Since there are many scenarios and safeguards inside Rokkasho reprocessing facility, all of the
analyses in this section will focus only on the diversion scenarios of plutonium inside MBA2 to
show the methods and the examples of the results. Using the same processes, a complete
evaluation of the whole facility can be accomplished.
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4.4.1 Success Tree Path Sets and Diversion Pathways
Consider the scenario where the proliferator is trying to obtain the plutonium nitrate during the
transfer from plutonium purification process and co-denitration process, using the notation in the
previous section, this is scenario S2-6. In order to succeed with the diversion, the proliferator
must elude the following safeguards: Electromanometer (SMMS - PM), Temperature Sensor
(SMMS - HI), Neutron Detector (SMMS - NC), and Hybrid K-Edge Densitometry (ASAS -
DA).
A path set is a set of basic events that must be true in order for the top event to be true. In this
case the top event is the event that proliferator succeed in diverting special nuclear material
(SNM). For this to be true, the proliferator must make an attempt to divert SNM, which is the
initiator event in this case, and the proliferator must elude all of the safeguards in place to detect
the diversion.
Figure 4-13. Success tree of the diversion scenario S2-6
Each of the safeguard has its own success tree as shown in Chapter 2. The diversion pathway is
the set the events in the tree that will make the top event success. The Minimal Path Set (MPS),
which is the set of events that cause the success of the top event, not containing another path set
as a subset.
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Using the probability of the top event as the measurement to compare the effectiveness of the
diversion pathways, there are two variables. First one is the mass of material that is being diverted
per attempt, and the second one is the choice of tactics by the proliferators to attack the safeguard.
The equation for the calculation of the event probability in the success tree is shown below.
Pr(TOP) = HPr(MPS,)
i=1 (4-1)
Therefore,
Pr(TOP) = (Pr(PM)) (Pr(HI)) (Pr(NC)) (Pr(DA)) (4-2)
Pr(TOP): Probability that proliferator divert SNM successfully without detection
Pr(PM): Probability that processing monitoring system (electromanometer) is eluded
Pr(HI): Probability that heat inspection system (temperature sensor) is eluded
Pr(NC): Probability that neutron counter (He-3 neutron detector) is eluded
Equation 4-1 is only true when the events within the minimal path set are independent.
Depending on the choice of tactics by the proliferator, the probability to elude each safeguard will
be different. Consider the success tree of a neutron counter, shown in Figure 4-14.
Figure 4-14. Success tree of a neutron counter
76
Table 4-11. Proliferator tactics to elude a neutron counter and the sub-tree events for each tactic
Safeguard Proliferator Tactic to Elude Tactic Sub-tree Eventsthe Safeguard
Without tactic (NCWT) Neutron counter is eluded by design (NCDS)
Breaking NC by a fake System optical surveillance is eluded (OSESYS),
accident (NCFA) Accident inspection is eluded (SIEAI)
Detector/hardware modification is not detected by NC
Detector/hardware (NCDHMD),
modification (NCDHM) System optical surveillance is eluded (OSESYS),
System seal is eluded (SLESYS)
Signal/data modification is not detected by NC
Neutron Signal/data modification (NCSDMD),
Counter (NC) (NCSDM) System optical surveillance is eluded (OSESYS),
System seal is eluded (SLESYS)
Use of dummy material is not detected by NC
(NC DM D),Use dummy material (NCDM) (CD_)System optical surveillance is eluded (OSEMAT),
System seal is eluded (SL_E_MAT)
Placing compensating material Placing compensating material in the detection region
ainge dcmeting erial is not detected NC (NCCMD-D),
n the detc region System optical surveillance is eluded (OSESYS),
System seal is eluded (SL_E_SYS)
If one of the tactics by the proliferator is successful, then the proliferator succeeds in eluding the
neutron counter. Therefore, the probability of eluding neutron counter is calculated by the
following equation.
Pr(NC) =1- H(1 - Pr(MPSj))
j-1
Pr(NC) = 1 - (1 - Pr(NCFA)) (1 - Pr(NCDHM)) (1 - Pr(NCSDM))
(1 - Pr(NCDM)) (1 - Pr(NCCMD)) (1 - Pr(NCWT))
(4-3)
(4-4)
Pr(NCFA): Probability that neutron counter is not working by a fake accident
Pr(NCDHM): Probability that neutron counter is eluded by detector/hardware modification
Pr(NCSDM): Probability that neutron counter is eluded by signal/data modification
Pr(NCDM): Probability that neutron counter is eluded by use of dummy material
Pr(NCCMD): Probability that neutron counter is eluded by placing compensating material in the
detection region
Pr(NCWT): Probability that neutron counter is eluded without proliferator tactic
For an example, if the proliferator chooses to use dummy material in order to elude the neutron
detector, the probability of eluding neutron detector is the probability that neutron detector does
not detect the use of dummy material and the material optical surveillance and seal does not
detect the attempt. Figure below shows the success tree of the event when a neutron counter is
eluded by the use of dummy material
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Figure 4-15. Success tree of a neutron counter for case that proliferator attempts to use dummy material
Therefore,
Pr(NCDM) = (Pr(NCDMD)) (Pr(OS_E_MAT)) (Pr(SLEMAT)) (4-5)
Pr(NCDMD): Probability that use of dummy material is not detected by NC
Pr(OSEMAT): Probability that material optical surveillance is eluded
Pr(SLEMAT): Probability that material seal is eluded
Each of the probability of eluding the supporting safeguard can still be expanded depending on
the proliferator tactic to those safeguards, using the same method as for a neutron counter. The
table below shows the possible choices of tactics the proliferator can use to elude the supporting
safeguards of a neutron counter.
Table 4-12. Proliferator tactics to elude material optical surveillance and seal and their sub-tree events
Supporting Proliferator Tactic to Elude the Tactic Sub-tree EventsSafeguard Safeguard
Without tactic (OSWT) Optical surveillance is eluded by design (OSDS)
Breaking OS by a fake accident Accident inspection is eluded (SI_E_AI)(OSFA)
Material Optical Detector/Hardware Detector/Hardware modification is not detected by
Surveillance Modification (OSDHM) (OS DHM D),
(OSEMAT) Modificat) System seal is eluded (SLESYS)
Signal/Data Modification Signal/Data modification is not detected by OS
(OSSDM) (OSSDMD),System seal is eluded (SLESYS)
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Supporting Proliferator Tactic to Elude the Tactic Sub-tree EventsSafeguard Safeguard
Without tactic (SLWT) Seal is eluded by design (SLDS)
Breaking SL by a fake accident System optical surveillance is eluded (OSESYS),
(SLFA) Accident inspection is eluded (SI_E_AI)
Repairing the broken seal Repairing broken seal is not detected by seal
(SLRPR) inspection (SLRPRD),Material Seal System optical surveillance is eluded (OSESYS)
(SL_E_MAT) Replacing the broken seal Replacing broken seal is not detected by seal
(SLRPC) inspection (SLRPCD),System optical surveillance is eluded (OSESYS)
Seal record modification Seal record modification is not detected by seal
(SLRM) inspection (SLRMD),Seal inspector is eluded (SIESLI)
To calculate the probability of eluding these two safeguards for all possible tactics, more tactics
choices to elude system optical surveillance, system seal, accident inspection, and seal inspector
must be considered.
For a set of proliferator tactics chosen for primary and supporting safeguard, the proliferator
success probability can be calculated. For an example, a proliferator attempts to divert SNM
using scenario S2-6, while using dummy material to replace the material that has been diverted
and modifying the images recorded by the optical surveillance camera. The proliferator is also
required to repair the material seal and optical surveillance system seal to avoid detection. The
following is the summary of tactics.
Primary Safeguards:
Electromanometer (PM): Without tactic (PMWT)
Temperature Sensor (HI): Use dummy material (HIDM)
He-3 Neutron Detector (NC): Use dummy material (NCDM)
Hybrid K-Edge Densitometry (DA): Use dummy material (DADM)
Supporting Safeguards:
Material Optical Surveillance (OSEMAT): Signal/Data modification (OSSDM)
Safeguard System Optical Surveillance (OSEMAT): Without tactic (SIWT)
Material Seal (SL_EMAT): Repair broken seal (SLRPR)
Safeguard System Seal (SLESYS): Repair broken seal (SLRPR)
Using the equations described before, the proliferator success probability to divert the material for
scenario S2-6 is the following. Bold face shows the events that will be expanded in the next step.
Pr(TOP) = (Pr(PM)) (Pr(HI)) (Pr(NC)) (Pr(DA))
= (Pr(PMDS)) (Pr(HIDM)) (Pr(NCDM)) (Pr(DADM))
= (Pr(PMDS)) (Pr(HI DMD)) (Pr(NCDMD)) (Pr(DADMD)) (Pr(OSEMAT))
(Pr(SL_E_MAT))
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Pr(TOP) = (Pr(PMDS)) (Pr(HIDMD)) (Pr(NCDMD)) (Pr(DADMD))
(Pr(OSSDMD)mt) (Pr(SLESYS)) (Pr(SLRPRD)mat) (Pr(OS_E_SYS))
= (Pr(PMDS)) (Pr(HIDMD)) (Pr(NCDMD)) (Pr(DADMD))
(Pr(OSSDM_D)mat) (Pr(SLRPRD)sys) (Pr(SLRPRD)mat) (Pr(OSSDMD),y,)
(4-6)
When applying probability calculation into success tree, the set of event must be a minimal path
set, therefore, when expanding the event into sub-tree, if the sub-tree contains an event that has
already exists, then it will not reappear into the equation.
By varying the mass of the material being diverted and the proliferator tactics, the proliferator
success probability of each set of tactics can be calculated and compared.
To demonstrate quantitative results, the following tables contain a fictitious example of basic
event probabilities for the base case cost of all the safeguards related to scenario S2-6. The point
estimates of the basic event probabilities are for three different mass of diverted material per
attempt; mi = 0.05kg, m 2 = 0.5kg, m3 = 5kg. Let Pr be the probability of success of that event.
See the success trees in Appendix A for the full diagrams and names/IDs of the basic events.
Please note that the numbers in the following tables are made up by the author. They do not
represent any real safeguard system.
Primary Safeguards
Probability that process Probability that Probability that signal/data
Process monitoring is eluded by detector/hardware modification is not
Monitoring design (PMDS) modification is not detected by PM(PM) detected by PM
mi___m2__m3_ (PMDHMD) (PMSDMD)
Electromanometer 0.5 0.2 0.05 0.8 0.75
(SMMS) I I
Probability that Probability that Probability that
heat inspection is detector/ Probability that Probability that placing
Heat eluded by design hardware signal/data use of dummy compensatmgInspection (HIDS) modification is material is not material in theInHpctio modification is not detected by maeilisnt dteionth
(HI) not detected by HI y detected by HI etion
HI H HI M D) region is not
mi M2 (HDHM D) (HISDMD) (HIDMD) detected by HI
-D - (HICMDD)
Temperature
Sensor 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.8 0.75 0.8 0.9
(SMMS)
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Probability that Probability
neutron counter is Probability Probability Probability that placing
eluded by design that detector/ that signal/data that use of compensating
Neutron (NCDS) hardware modification is dummy material in the
Counter modification is not detected by material is not detection
(NC) not detected by NC detected by region is not
mi M2 MN NC NC SDM D) NC detected by
(NCDHMD) - - (NCDMD) NC
(NCCMDD)
He-3
Neutron 0.4 0.15 0.1 0.8 0.75 0.6 0.7
Detector
(SMMS)
Probability that Probability that Probability that Probability that use
Destructive destructive analysis avoiding random sample of dummy material
Analysis is eluded by design sampling is not modification is not is not detected by
(DA) (DADS) detected by DA detected by DA DA
mI m 2  m 3  (NCARSD) (DASMD) (DADMD)
Hybrid K-
Edge 0.3 0.1 0.01 0.95 0.9 0.25
Densitometry
(ASAS)
Supporting Safeguards
Probability that optical Probability that Probability that
Optical Surveillance surveillance is eluded by detector/hardware signal/data modification
(OS) design (OSDS) modification is not is not detected by OSdetected by OS (OS SDM D)MI M2 M3 (OSDHMD)
Material OS 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.6
Safeguard System OS 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.6
Facility OS 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.6
Probability that seal Probability that Probability that Probability that seal
is eluded by design repairing broken replacing broken record modification
Seal (SL) (SLDS) seal is not detected seal is not detected is not detected by
by seal inspection by seal inspection seal inspection
mI m2  m3  (SLRPRD) (SLRPCD) (SLRMD)
Material Seal 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.3 0.2 0.9
Syte Seal 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.4 0.3 0.9
Sample Seal 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.3 0.2 0.9
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Probability that safeguard Probability that faking an Probability that bribing
Safeguard by the by the inspector is eluded accident to prevent
Inspector by design (SIDS) inspection is not detected the inspector is not
(SI) by the inspector (SUBUD)
(SIFAD) -BID)
Random Sampling 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.3 0.3
Sample Monitoring 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.3
Seal Recording 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.3 0.3
Accident 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3Inspection 0 0 0
First, by varying the choices of proliferator tactics to the supporting safeguards, the probability of
eluding a primary safeguard for a certain tactic choice can be calculated. Table 4-13 shows the
probability of eluding a neutron counter by using a dummy material for every possible set of
tactics to the supporting safeguards for three different amount of material diverted per attempt.
Table 4-13. Proliferator success probability for all possible sets of tactics for NCDM event
Case Cn
No.
U Cn Ctn U)i Cii -
z 0 0 0 C/
1 0.009 . e
2 0.003 . e__
3 0.0006 . e__
4 0.0009 . e__
5 0.015 . e__
6 0.006 . _
7 0.003 . e _
8 0.0162 . _
9 0.0006 . _
10 0.0024 . e_ _
11 0.0036 . e e
12 0.015 . 0
13 0.0024 . e__
14 0.0006 . e__
15 0.0162 e
16 0.0018 e e _
17 0.0216 e e _
18 0.0324 e e e
19 0.045 a e
20 0.0072 a e e
21 0.0018 a a e
22 0.0108 0 _ a
23 0.0012 a e _
24 0.0096 a a _
25 0.0144 a a
26 0.03 a a _
27 0.0048 a e _
28 0.0012 a e e
29 0.0486 ee e
30 0.0054 ee a
31 0.017496 a a _
32 0.026244 a a e
33 0.081 a a e
34 0.0324 a a
35 0.0162 a e a
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Figure 4-16. Probability of eluding neutron counter by using a dummy material for different sets of
proliferator tactics to supporting safeguards
Figure 4-16 shows the plots of probabilities from Table 4-13. The spikes with high probabilities
are for the cases when the proliferator attempt to divert very small amount of material without
any tactic to the optical surveillance system. The high spike on the far right side of the plot is
when the proliferator attempt to modify the seal record. This results show that, for this example,
the effectiveness of the optical surveillance system to detect small amount of material and the seal
protection from record modification must be improved.
Figure 4-17 shows the comparison of the probability plots between different proliferator tactics to
elude a neutron counter for different material mass per diversion attempt, assuming proliferator
attempt the same set of tactic to the supporting safeguards. The solid lines are the probability of
eluding neutron counter without any tactic.
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0.144
DHM SDM
Ploriferator tactics
CM D
Figure 4-17. Probability of eluding neutron counter for different tactics
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The relative proliferator success probabilities to elude a neutron counter for different tactics is
shown for this example. They are fairly comparable, except the case where the proliferator
attempts a fake accident, which mean no tactic is significantly better than the others. The solid
lines showing the probabilities to elude a neutron counter without any tactic display a comparison
for the proliferator choices whether or not a concealment tactic is required.
Following the same method, the proliferator success probability to elude the safeguards in place
to detect the scenario S2-6 can be calculated for different sets of proliferator tactics and derived
the set of tactics that give the highest proliferator success probability to elude each safeguard.
Then by varying both the tactics to the primary safeguard and the tactics to the supporting
safeguard, the top sets of tactic that give the highest proliferator success probability to divert the
material by the scenario can be derived.
Besides the scenarios and set of tactics that provide the highest proliferator success probabilities,
the analysis should also be carried out to compare the suggested or most likely diversion path way
that the experts recommend during the elicitation process.
4.4.2 Uncertainty Analysis
The uncertainty analysis technique has been extensively developed and applied in the area of
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). Since the proliferation assessment relies on incomplete
information, there are uncertainties in the judgment of the expert. These uncertainties are
provided by the experts when they give the point estimates of the probabilities.
There are two types of uncertainties: aleatory and epistemic. Aleatory uncertainty is the model
uncertainty, which is the variability of the model that predicts the quantity. In this case, the
aleatory uncertainty is the success tree model. The epistemic uncertainty is the parameter
uncertainty, which is the uncertainty due to the incomplete knowledge of the value of the
parameter of the aleatory model. In this case, the epistemic uncertainty is the uncertainty of the
inputs from the expert's judgment.
The point estimates of the model parameter and the epistemic uncertainties vary from different
experts depending on their state-of-knowledge of the system. The expert who is experienced with
the system and have high confidence with his/her state-of-knowledge will be able to estimate the
probabilities with less uncertainties than the expert who is less familiar with the system.
The basic events probabilities derived from expert elicitation are assumed to be normally
distributed. The experts provide the uncertainty of the point estimate by giving the 95%
confidence intervals. Then the standard deviations of the distributions of the basic events
probabilities can be obtained. When inserting these values into the success tree model, the
uncertainty of the basic events will propagate through to the probability of the TOP event. The
calculation is done by the Monte Carlo sampling technique. For demonstration of the calculation,
the example in the prior discussion for the case with scenario S2-6 and the set of proliferator
tactics is used.
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Pr(TOP) = (Pr(PMDS)) (Pr(HIDMD)) (Pr(NCDMD)) (Pr(DADMD))
(Pr(OSSDMD)mat) (Pr(SLRPRD),ys) (Pr(SLRPRD)mat) (Pr(OSSDMD),y,)
(4-7)
The following table shows the fictitious example results with uncertainties of the related
parameters from the elicitation process.
Table 4-14. Example of basic event probabilities point estimates and standard deviations
Basic Events Probabilities Point Estimate Standard Deviation
Pr(PMDS) 0.2 0.02
Pr(HIDMD) 0.8 0.05
Pr(NCDMD) 0.6 0.03
Pr(DADMD) 0.25 0.01
Pr(OSSDMD)mat 0.6 0.04
Pr(SLRPRD)sys 0.4 0.03
Pr(SLRPRD)mat 0.3 0.01
Pr(OSSDMD)ys, 0.6 0.05
Using Monte Carlo sampling technique with 10000 sample points, the following show the result
or the TOP event probability with propagated uncertainties from the basic events.
Event Probability Point Estimate Standard Deviation
Pr(TOP) 1.0368E-3 1.579E-4
When integrated the uncertainty analysis into the diversion pathway analysis, the results provide
complete information to compare the proliferator success probability between scenarios and
tactics. The proliferator success probabilities and uncertainties of different scenarios in MBA2 for
the set tactics that give the highest proliferator success probability can be derived.
4.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The sensitivity analysis provides a systematic and visualized way to see the effect of the inputs or
the basic events to the outcome. By changing the values of the inputs one by one, while keeping
the rest constant, the change in the outcome indicates the amount of effect each input has on the
outcome.
There are two goals for the sensitivity analyses. The first one is investigation of the effect upon
which experts have estimated the basic event probabilities. This analysis tests how much the
different beliefs of an expert would affect the output. This can be accomplished by determining
how much the proliferator success probability changes according to changes of the values of the
input variables.
Two cases will be considered. For the first case, the inputs from the experts are divided by half,
representing the estimate of lower proliferator success probability. The second case, the inputs
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from the experts are set to twice the original values, representing the estimate of higher success
probability. The original inputs from the experts will be called "base case".
For an example, Table below shows fictitious inputs from 4 different experts for the probability
that a neutron counter does not detect the use of dummy material by the proliferator (NCDMD)
and the values of the each input for the two cases.
Table 4-15. Example of probabilities estimates from four expert for base case and case I and II
Pr(NCDM.D)
Expert Case I Case IIBase Case (Base Case/2) (Base Case*2)
Expert A 0.65 0.325 1
Expert B 0.45 0.225 0.9
Expert C 0.5 0.25 1
Expert D 0.8 0.4 1
The following plot shows the probability of the TOP event resulting from each case
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0.0012
0.001
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O 0.0004CL
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-r- Case 11
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Expert
Figure 4-18. Probability of the TOP event for different cases, Expert.
The second goal is to perform a sensitivity analysis of the basic events to the TOP event, which
involves varying each basic event probability in turn, while the rest of the probabilities remain at
the values of the base case, this is done in order to see how the variation in the basic event affects
the variation in the output.
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4.4.4 Importance Measure Analysis
The importance measure is the method to identify the effect of the basic event probabilities to the
top events. In this case, the importance measure will be use to rank the importance of the primary
and supporting safeguard to the proliferator diversion success probability for each scenarios.
There are three commonly used importance measures: Risk Achievement Worth (RAW), Risk
Reduction Worth (RRW), and Fussell-Vesely (FV)(Michael C. Cheok 1998). In this case, the risk
is the proliferator success probability. The definitions below are modified to suit with the success
tree model.
R*
Risk Achievement Worth a. = '
Risk Reduction Worth r= -4
R_
R -R- R-
Fussel - Vesely FV = 0 '=1 '
Ro Ro
R*= overall model success probability with the success probability of event i set to 1
R-= overall model success probability with the success probability of event i set to 0;
Ro = base case of overall model success probability
The RAW presents a measure of the worth of the basic event in achieving the TOP event success
probability and indicates the importance of maintaining the level of probability of that basic event
at the current level. The RRW presents maximum decrease of the TOP event success probability
if event i never succeed, in the other word, the maximum improvement of safeguard related to
event i. The Fussel-Vesely importance is a measure of the fraction contribution of the basic event
to the TOP event success probability when the basic event success probability is changed from its
base value to zero. The RRW and FV importance measure are related and the relative importance
of the basic events from both measures is identical.
Using the example set of tactics in the prior discussion for scenario S2-6, the table below show
the values of RAW importance measure for each of the basic events.
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Table 4-16. Example of basic event probabilities estimates and importance measures
Probability of the Importance
Basic Event Basic Event Pr(BE) Measure [Rank]
(BE)RAW
PMDS 0.2 5 [1]
HIDMD 0.8 1.25 [8]
NCDMD 0.6 1.67 [5]
DADMD 0.25 4 [2]
OSSDM Dmat 0.6 1.67 [5]
SLRPR DSys 0.4 2.5 [4]
SLRPRDmat 0.3 3.3 [3]
OSSDMDS, 0.6 1.67 [5]
From the table, the most important basic event for this set of tactics is the probability that the
proliferator will elude processing monitoring by its design. The second is the tactic where
proliferator attempt to use dummy material to elude destructive. These show that these two are
strong safeguard, while the last one which is the probability to elude the heat inspection by
dummy material could be improved.
For further analysis, the importance measure of the same basic event can also be compare for
different scenario, to find the different of amount of the effect each safeguard has on different
scenarios.
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Chapter 5 Facility Design and Safeguards Scheme
Analyses
In Chapter 4, the evaluation of existing safeguard schemes have been shown for different
scenarios of proliferator diversion attempts. This chapter contains how the evaluation will help
with design a facility and safeguard scheme.
5.1 Design and Cost of a Reprocessing Facility
There are two methods to increase proliferation resistance.
1. Design the processes and the forms of the materials inside the facility such that the
materials are self-protected. In another word, the materials are in the forms that are
difficult to handle, such as emitting high radiation, and difficult to be used for weapon
construction, such as being very low enriched in U-235 or Pu-239. The limitation is the
technology current available for the facility designers.
2. Improve the safeguard scheme of the facility by the safeguarder, such that the detection
probabilities of all possible diversion scenarios are very high. The limitation is the
amount of resource of the safeguarder.
This is one of the biggest challenges for the nuclear fuel cycle to be widely used commercially.
As long as the material in the reprocessing facility can be quickly used to construct a nuclear
weapon and easily enough to be diverted without detection by the safeguarder, the risk will
remains too high for justification to build recycling facilities in non-nuclear weapon states.
The current safeguarder for the nuclear facilities in the non-nuclear weapon states is the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is operating under tight budget and even though
half of the annual budget goes to nuclear safeguard and verification, there are 1,131 facilities
under safeguards or at least containing safeguarded material, as of 31 December 2008 (IAEA,
Annual Report 2008). Therefore, the IAEA must allocate the funds effectively to achieve the best
protection against possible proliferation.
There are 4 common layers of protection against a material diversion in a nuclear facility
1. The type of the material, such as the isotope composition from the design of the processes
2. The form of the material, such as the physical container and the state the material
3. The safeguard scheme to detect the diversion attempts
4. The physical barrier security, such as facility boundary, walls, security guards.
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5.2 Safeguard Evaluation for Different Facility Designs
There are many variables in facility design that affect the effectiveness of the safeguards
Table 5-1. Variables that affect the effectiveness of the safeguards and methods to increase the value
Variable Design Factor Method to Increase the Effectiveness
of the Safeguards
Remove the background material,
Facility processes, Input increase the radioactivity of the
Material Composition material, Output material, materian to dncversin atte mt is
Burnup time easier to be detected by the
surveillance cameras
Put material into a form of countable
unit, such as a canister or a bottle, do
Facility processes, Material not have material flow in big chunk to
Material Form and Geometry container avoid the effect of the self shielding
effects, Use a uniform material for less
error in material accountancy
Size of the facility, Size of the Choose smaller plant design for
Material Flow Rate processes, Annual throughput, smaller mass flow rate and less
capacity factor material unaccounted for (MUF)
Use automatic process in the area
Material Accessibility by the Facility building design, where the material is highly attractive
Personnel Automatic processes for proliferation, so the diversion
attempt is easier to be detected
By varying this design variable the change in the top event probability can be obtained and
ranked to find which variable affect the effectiveness of the safeguard the most. These factors
then can be emphasized during the facility design process in order to maximize the proliferation
protection by the safeguards.
For example, considering the MBA2 of Rokkasho reprocessing facility, an analysis can compare
the effectiveness of a neutron counter for two different material flow rates through the Output
Accountability Tank (OAT). If the uncertainties of measurements for both flow rates are
approximately at the same value of percentage, i.g. 1% of the flow rates, then the probabilities of
detecting the diversion for 1% of material from both flow rates are equal. Therefore, a proliferator
has the same probability of success to divert more amount of material for the design with higher
flow rate than the design with lower flow rate. Results from the analysis will show the
comparison of safeguard effectiveness between the two facility designs and provide quantitative
information for the safeguarder to regulate the plant operations that affect the flow of the material
in MBA2.
90
5.3 Cost Effectiveness of the Safeguard Scheme
By evaluating the efficiency of the safeguard for different setups and costs, the safeguarder can
determine the best resource allocation to particular safeguards that will greatly decrease the
proliferator success probability.
There are two types of cost effectiveness analysis to consider; analysis of the existing safeguards
in the facility, and analysis or effectiveness of adding a new safeguard.
5.3.1 Existing Safeguard Cost Effectiveness Analysis
First type is the analysis of the cost effectiveness of the current safeguard in a facility. From the
results of the expert elicitation, the proliferator success probability can be derived for the range of
the cost of safeguard setups to increase the safeguard effectiveness and prevent proliferator
tactics. By vary the cost of the safeguard and calculate the success probability to elude the
safeguard, the percentage change of the probability versus the amount of difference in cost will
show the most effective way to put in resource to increase the safeguard efficiency and
protection.
The results from the expert elicitation contain the information of the proliferator success
probability in terms of the cost of the safeguard related to the possible tactics by the proliferator.
The total cost of the safeguard is the sum of all of the cost to prevent all the tactics.
For example, the table below shows fictitious results from a neutron counter expert elicitation.
The experts provide the estimate of the proliferator success probabilities at three different costs of
the safeguard setups to detect each of the proliferator tactics.
Table 5-2. Example results of the proliferator success probabilities to elude NC a function of safeguard cost
Proliferator Tactic to Elude NC Low Cost Base Case High CostSetup Setup Setup
Safeguard Cost ($M) 0.05 0.2 1
NCDS Probability for i, 0.9 0.4 
0.25
Probability for m2 0.3 0.15 0.1
Probability for M3 0.2 0.1 0.05
NC DHM D Safeguard Cost ($M) 0.05 0.3 1
Probability 0.95 0.8 0.4
NCSDMD Safeguard Cost ($M) 0.05 0.1 0.5
Probability 0.9 0.75 0.2
NCDMD Safeguard Cost ($M) 0.05 0.2 1
Probability 0.85 0.6 0.2
NCCMDD Safeguard Cost ($M) 0.05 0.2 1
~_ ~_Probability 0.9 0.7 0.15
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The cost of a neutron counter is the sum of the component costs to protect from each type of the
proliferator tactics.
CNC CDS + CDHM + SDM + CDM + CCMD (5-1)
Consider the cases where the proliferator uses the same set of tactics for the supporting safeguard,
Figure 5-1 shows improvement to the safeguard effectiveness by adding or decreasing the
component of the safeguards that helps detecting the tactic of using dummy material to elude a
neutron counter.
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Figure 5-1. Probability to elude NC with DM for different cost of the safeguard
The result shows that by increasing the cost to protect NC from DM for $0.8 million, the
probability to elude the NC by DM decreases by 0.096, which is not much significant comparing
to the decrease of the success probability from the low cost to the base case cost which reduce for
0.06 for only $0.15 million more. This justify that the investment for the base case protection
components is fairly cost effective.
Figure 5-2 shows the probability to elude NC versus costs of the safeguards with different
proliferator tactics, considering that the proliferator uses the same set of tactics for the supporting
safeguards. The results show that in order for the safeguarder to reach the same safeguard
effectiveness to prevent each type of tactic, the safeguarder must devote more resources to protect
the safeguard from DHM than DM and CDM, and more than SDM.
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Figure 5-2. Probability to elude NC versus costs of the safeguard for different tactics
Moreover, by comparing the percentage changes of success probabilities between the changes of
the cost of different safeguards, the safeguarder can decide on the priority of safeguards which to
allocate the limited funding.
5.3.2 Additional Safeguard Cost Effectiveness Analysis
The section contains the analysis of cost effectiveness of adding a new safeguard into the scheme.
Considering scenarios in MBA2 as in the analysis in Chapter 4 with a new safeguard introduced
to the system. The new safeguard system is the Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence (NRF).
NRF is an active interrogation technique. Excitation of nuclides is caused by an incident
Bremsstrahlung beam. When the excited state decays, the characteristic photons are radiated into
all directions with respect to the incident beam, leading to unique photon energies of resonance
fluorescence. The radiated photons can be detected by a detector and used to identify the nucleus
of the material by the unique energy spectrum of the radiated photons.
The advantage of NRF technique is due to the gamma radiation generated and induced by the
active Bremsstrahlung beam that is able to penetrate the fuel assembly envelope and eventually
the cask holding it.
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Figure 5-3. Diagram of safeguard system in MBA2 with NRF
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Then the list of safeguards and possible scenarios is changed to the following.
Table 5-3. List of possible material diversion scenario for MBA2 with NRF system
Scenario Scenario Material Preventing SafeguardsID
Divert spent fuel solvent during Electromanometer (SMMS - PM)
S2-1 the transfer between dissolution Spent fuel Temperature Sensor (SMMS -HI)process to chemical separation solvent Neutron Detector (SMMS - NC)
process
Electromanometer (SMMS - PM)
S2-2 Divert spent fuel during the Spent fuel Temperature Sensor (SMMS -HI)
chemical separation process solvent Neutron Detector (SMMS - NC)
Modify the organic or complexing Pu Nitrate Electromanometer (SMMS - PM)
agents to redirect more plutonium Pu . ate Temperature Sensor (SMMS -HI)
S2-3 into the waste stream, then divert it ste Neutron Detector (SMMS - NC)
the material stream during the (MA, FPs) Pu(VI) Spectrophotometric (ASAS -
transfer to waste storage DA)
Electromanometer (SMMS - PM)
Temperature Sensor (SMMS -HI)
Divert plutonium during the Neutron Detector (SMMS - NC)S2-4 pPu Nitrate Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence (NRFplutonium purification process 
-GRS)
Hybrid K-Edge Densitometry (ASAS -
DA)
S2-5 Divert uranium during the uranium U Nitrate Electromanometer (SMMS - PM)purification process Temperature Sensor (SMMS -HI)
Electromanometer (SMMS - PM)
Temperature Sensor (SMMS -HI)
Divert plutonium during the Neutron Detector (SMMS - NC)
S2-6 transfer between purification Pu Nitrate Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence (NRF
process and co-denitration process - GRS)
Hybrid K-Edge Densitometry (ASAS -
DA)
The same analysis as in Chapter 4 can be carried out to find the proliferator success probabilities
for different proliferator choices of tactics. The results can be used to justify whether the addition
of the NRF system is worth the extra cost added.
For an example, considering the scenario 2-6 with the sets of tactics as discussed in the earlier
sections. Assume that the proliferator also attempt to use dummy material to elude the NRF
system. Here is the list of the updated set of tactics.
Primary Safeguards:
Electromanometer (PM): Without tactic (PMWT)
Temperature Sensor (HI): Use dummy material (HIDM)
He-3 Neutron Detector (NC): Use dummy material (NCDM)
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Hybrid K-Edge Densitometry (DA): Use dummy material (DADM)
Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence (NRF): Use dummy material (NRFDM)
Supporting Safeguards:
Material Optical Surveillance (OSEMAT): Signal/Data modification (OSSDM)
Safeguard System Optical Surveillance (OSEMAT): Without tactic (SIWT)
Material Seal (SLEMAT): Repair broken seal (SLRPR)
Safeguard System Seal (SLESYS): Repair broken seal (SLRPR)
The TOP event probability is then
Pr(TOP) = (Pr(PMDS)) (Pr(HI DMD)) (Pr(NCDMD)) (Pr(DADM_D)) (Pr(NRFDMD))
(Pr(OSSDMD).,) (Pr(SLRPRD)ys) (Pr(SLRPRD)mat) (Pr(OSSDMD),y,)
With the example of result for the NRF from the expert elicitation, the following table shows the
results comparing between the safeguard scheme with and without the NRF.
Event NRFDMD TOP without NRF TOP with NRF
Probability 0.15 0.001037 0.0001555
Adding the NRF decrease the proliferator success probability by almost an order of magnitude.
Comparing cost effectiveness of improving the current safeguard and the cost of adding NRF to
the safeguard scheme. From this example, the cost of the NRF will be $ 1M for the base case.
Comparing the improvement to the safeguards in prior discussion, adding an NRF is much more
cost effective. Therefore, this justifies the significant of adding NRF into the safeguard scheme.
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Chapter 6 Conclusion
6.1 Summary of the Framework
This framework presents a complete and systematic method for a safeguard evaluation in a
nuclear facility. The complete procedures to identify safeguard systems and possible diversion
scenarios are shown for the Rokkasho reprocessing facility. Then discussions and examples of
success tree analyses are presented with fictitious results in the format derived from the
introduced expert elicitation process.
The success tree methodology is used as a tool to evaluate proliferator diversion success
probability of a safeguard scheme by dividing the scheme into safeguard systems categorized by
safeguard types. Proliferator success probability to elude a safeguard depends on the amount of
material diverted per attempt and the sets of concealment tactics used by the proliferator to help
elude the safeguards. The tactics can range from attacking the safeguard system itself to
modifying the material under detection. However, by attempting extra tactics to help elude the
safeguards, the attempts can also be detected by the supporting safeguards that are in place to
detect these tactics.
The basic event probabilities in the success tree are functions of many variables depending on the
diversion scenario of the proliferator and the safeguard scheme set up by the safeguarder.
Analyses of these factors capture the competition between the two actors where the proliferator is
trying to choose a scenario that gives the highest diversion success probability, and the
safeguarder is trying to setup a safeguard scheme that minimizes the diversion success
probabilities for all possible scenarios. A diversion scenario consists of target material, target
location, diversion technique, set of tactics to help elude the safeguards, and the amount of
material diverted per attempt. The safeguard scheme can vary depending on resources devoted to
the safeguards by the safeguarder. Its effectiveness also depends on the designs of the facility.
With these variables embedded in the design of the model, results can be extensively analyzed for
many applications.
Expert elicitation is used to derive the probabilities of the basic events via expert judgments. The
framework provides a systematic approach for the processes of inquiring the expert judgments by
having qualitative discussions with the experts to obtain the optimal safeguard setups and its
vulnerabilities, prior of a quantitative questionnaire. Questions for the experts are conveniently
tailored for them to answer with minimal calculation required. An example of a fully prepared
document for the expert elicitation is provided in Appendix A.
Finally, the diversion pathways analysis to evaluate the safeguard scheme with the uncertainties is
shown along with sensitivity and importance measure analyses. Results of the analyses can be
used by the safeguarder to gauge the level of protection provided by the current safeguard
scheme, and to identify the weak points for further improvements. The safeguarder is also able to
further analyze the effectiveness of the safeguard scheme for different facility designs to suggest
the best designs for proliferation resistance of new facilities. Finally, the cost effectiveness
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analysis will help the safeguarder allocate the limited resources for maximum possible protection
against a material diversion attempt.
6.2 Effectiveness of the Model
This section contains a discussion about the effectiveness of the success tree model and the use of
expert elicitation to acquire the probabilities of basic events.
The effectiveness of the model depends heavily on the accuracy of expert judgments. Therefore,
the elicitation process must be properly conducted to obtain the best estimations of the
probabilities. The selected experts must be fairly familiar with the safeguard system under study.
Higher number of experts per safeguard and more diversity of expert backgrounds will greatly
improve accuracy of the results. For the questionnaire, the conductor of the elicitation must
ensure that the safeguard setup, which the experts use to provide the estimates, is consistent
among the experts. The definitions of the proliferator tactics must be clear and contain a complete
list of possible actions. These steps are important for the validity of the aggregation of expert
inputs and eventually the effectiveness of the model.
In order to obtain accurate and insightful results from the analyses, complete information of target
facility and safeguard scheme is required. This can be a limitation of the study because most of
the detailed information is classified and there are small numbers of experts who have
experiences with the actual systems. For this reason, an open study must be conducted with
approximate safeguard setups and facility designs, or a close study must be done carefully by a
government entity or the IAEA to avoid leaking security information that could compromise the
safeguard systems to a proliferator.
With complete information and careful expert elicitation, one more approach to improve the
effectiveness of the model is to create higher number of proliferator scenarios with higher level of
details, and distinguish the proliferator tactics into several specific ones. This provides better
accuracy of estimations from the experts and more in-depth analyses. However, complexity of the
analyses will increase, along with the number of basic events for which the expert must provide
probability estimates.
6.3 Future Additional Work
The framework presented here is complete and ready to be used as a part of nuclear facility
proliferation resistance evaluation. For direct comparison of proliferation resistances between
different diversion scenarios, results of the analyses in this framework must be combined with the
material attractiveness, as discussed in Chapter 1. While only the evaluation for a reprocessing
facility is shown, the framework can be used for any facility in the nuclear fuel cycle, and can
also be extended to evaluate the safeguard scheme for fuel transportation between facilities by
defining suitable material balance areas. Further comparison of the effectiveness of the safeguard
scheme between facilities will provide the safeguarder quantitative information to identify the
strengths and weaknesses of their safeguard policies and resource allocations.
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1. Material Accountancy
1.lDestructive Analysis (DA)
Basic events descriptions of destructive analysis success tree
Proliferator Tactic Specific Tactic Examples Sub-tree Events
Proliferator does not attempt Proliferator diverts the
any tactic to DA material with small enough - Destructive analysis is eluded by
(DA NO ATT) Proliferator mteratith s uh designed (DA DS) Destructive analysis
does not attempt any tactic to amoun er attempt such that does not detect the material diversion
prevent DA from detecting the detecting the diversion because of its detection efficiency
diversion
Proliferator attempts to - Proliferator prevent the - Inspector sampling is eluded
avoid random sampling inspector to collect a sample (SIERS) The inspector does not
(DAARSATT) Proliferator from the area where the randomly collect sample from all parts
attempts to prevent the part of material is diverted of the material inside the MBA
atempts, threvn te art oe - Proliferator prepared a - Avoiding random sampling is not
material, where some has been sample or have a designated detected by DA (DA ARSD)diverted, from being randomly area for the inspector to Destructive analysis does not detect that
collect by the inspector collect a sample the sample is not randomly collected
- Sample seal is eluded (SL_ESP)
- Proliferator swap the Seal of the sample container does not
Proliferator attempts to sample during the site show that it has been opened
modify the sample inspection after it has been - Inspector monitoring is eluded
(DASMATT) Proliferator randomly collected by the (SIE_.SM) The inspector who monitor
attempts to replace or modify inspector the sample does not detect the sample
the sample after it has been - Proliferator swap the modification
randomly collected by the sample during its transit from - Sample modification is not detected
inspector the site to the inspection by DA (DASMD) Destructive
agency laboratory analysis does not detect that the sample
has been modified
- Material optical surveillance is
eluded (OS_EMAT) Optical
Proliferator attempts to use surveillance does not detect that the
dummy material - Proliferator replace the proliferator replace the diverted material
(DADMATT) Proliferator diverted material with the with a dummy material
replace the diverted material material that has the same Seal of the material container does not
with a dummy material that elemental or isotopic show that it has been opened
could avoid detection by the properties Use of dummy material is not
destructive analysis detected by DA (DA_DMD)
Destructive analysis does not detect that
the material is a dummy material
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1.2Non-Destructive Analysis (NDA)
All of these tactics apply to each type of the NDA (Gamma Ray Spectrometry, Neutron Counter,
Heat Inspection, Weight Inspection, and Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence)
Basic events descriptions of non-destructive analysis success tree
Proliferator Tactic Specific Tactic Examples Sub-tree Events
Proliferator does not attempt Proliferator diverts the Non-destructive analysis is
(NDANO ATT) Proliferator material with small enough eluded by designed (NDADS)
does not attempt any tactic to amount per attempt such that Non-destructive analysis does notprevent Na m dytectin the NDA has low probability of detect the material diversionprevent NDA from detecting the detecting the diversion because of its detection efficiencydiversion
Proliferator stages a fake Optical surveillance is eludedProliferator attempts to break -lerat stes a fake (OS-E-SYS) Optical surveillance
NDAelectrical system that cut the does not detect that the proliferator
(NDAFAATT) Proliferator power to the NDA system stages a fake accident
attempts to stage a fake accident -Proliferator sas a fake fire - Accident inspection is eluded
that will break the functionality system hardware (SIEAI) The accident inspection
of the NDA by the inspector cannot detect that it
has been staged
- System optical surveillance is
eluded (OSESYS) Optical
surveillance does not detect that the
proliferator tampers with the NDA
Proliferator attempts to detector/hardware
modify NDA detector/ - Proliferator modify the NDA - System seal is eluded
hardware (NDADHMATT) P.oeifor to g ive he na (SL E SYS) Seal of the NDA
Proliferator attempts to modify detector to give larger signa system does not show that it has
the detector or hardware of the mpensating for the diverted bee opened
NDA system, preventing it from - Detector/Hardware modification
detecting the missing material is not detected by NDA
(NDA_DHMD) Non-destructive
analysis system does not detect that
its detector/hardware has been
modified
- System optical surveillance is
eluded (OSESYS) Optical
surveillance does not detect that the
Proliferator attempts to - Proliferator feed a fake proliferator tampers with the NDA
modify NDA signal/data detector signal to the cables or processing system to
(NDA_SDM_ATT) Proliferator processing unit modify the signal/data
attempts to modify the signal - Proliferator hacks the NDA - System seal is eluded
between NDA detector and the system software to always (SL_ESYS) Seal of the NDAprcesng eunit or modify the display and store expected data system does not show that it hasprocessing t or moe the - Proliferator access and been opened
record data to remove the modifies the stored data before - Signal/data modification is notdetection signal the inspection detected by NDA (NDA_SDMD)
Non-destructive analysis signal and
data encryption does not detect that
its signal/data has been modified
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Proliferator Tactic Specific Tactic Examples Sub-tree Events
- Material optical surveillance is
eluded (OSEMAT) Optical
surveillance does not detect that the
Proliferator attempts to use proliferator 
replace the diverted
roliratra t tmaterial with a dummy material
dummy material - Proliferator replaces the - Material seal is eluded
(NDADMATT) Proliferator diverted material with a (SL EMAT) Seal of the material
attempts to replace the diverted material that has the same container does not show that it has
material with a dummy material NDA detecting properties been opened
to avoid the detection by the 
- Use of dummy material is not
NDA system detected by NDA (NDA_DMD)
Non-destructive analysis does not
detect that the material is a dummy
material
Material and System optical
surveillance is eluded
(OS_E_SYS) Optical surveillance
does not detect that the proliferator
places compensating material in the
Proliferator attempts to place detection region
compensating material in the Proliferator places the same - System seal is eluded
detection region (SL_E_SYS) Seal of the NDA
(NDA_CMDATT) Proliferator amount of material as the system, which prevent the access to
attempts to place compensating detecting region to fool the the detecting region, does not show
amount of material for the NDA system that it has been opened
diverted material in the NDA - Placing compensating material
detection region. in the detection region is not
detected by NDA (NDA_CMDD)
Non-destructive analysis does not
detect that the proliferator put
compensating material in the
detecting region
OSABt
Tme: OSlfta
Database: Safeguards.ped
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2. Containment and Surveillance
2.1 Optical Surveillance (OS)
Basic events descriptions of optical surveillance success tree
Proliferator Tactic Specific Tactic Examples Sub-tree Events
Proliferator does not attempt - Proliferator diverts the Optical Surveillance is eluded by
any tactic to OS material with small enough designed (OSDS) Optical
(OS_NOATT) Proliferator amount per attempt such that surveillance does not detect the
does not attempt any tactic to OS has low probability of material diversion because of its
prevent OS from detecting the detecting the diversion detection efficiency
diversion
Proliferator attempts to break - Proliferator stages a fake
OS by faking an accident electrical system that cut the - Accident inspection is eluded
(OSFAATT) Proliferator power to the OS system (SIEAI) The accident inspection
attempts to stage a fake accident - Proliferator stages a fake fire by the inspector cannot detect that it
that will break the functionality accident that breaks OS system has been staged
of the OS hardware
- System seal is eluded
Proliferator attempts to modify Proliferator modifies the (SL_E_SYS) Seal of the OS system
OS detector/ hardware digital OS camera to avoid does not show that it has been
(OSDHMATT) Proliferator displaying and storage of opened
attempts to modify the detector material diversion images - Detector/Hardware modification
or hardware of the OS system, - Proliferator moves the camera is not detected by OS
preventing it from detecting to another location that it will (OS_DHM_D) Optical surveillance
material diversion activity give the same images system does not detect that its
detector/hardware has been modified
Proliferator feed a fake - System seal is eluded
Proliferator attempts to modify (SL_ESYS) Seal of the OS system
OS signal/data images to the processing unit does not show that it has been
(OS_SDM_ATT) Proliferator system software to always opened
attempts to modify the signal - Signal/data modification is not
between o mdify the cisplay and store expected detected by OS (OSSDMD)
processing unit or modify the i-m aferator access and Optical surveillance software system
record data to remove the modifies the stored data before and data encryption does not detect
detection images the that its signal/data has been
the spetio modified
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2.2 Seal (SL)
Basic events descriptions of seal success tree
Proliferator Tactic Specific Tactic Examples Sub-tree Events
- Proliferator diverts the
Proliferator does not attempt material without having to - Seal is eluded by designed
any tactic to SL (SLNOATT) break the seal or the (SLDS) Seal does not detect the
Proliferator does not attempt any probability that the seal material diversion because of its
tactic to prevent SL from inspection will detect that that detection efficiency
detecting the diversion seal has been broken is low
- Optical surveillance is eluded
Proliferator attempts to break (OSE SYS) Optical surveillanceProliferfatorg atemptst Proliferator stages a fake fire does not detect that the proliferator
(Slb_FA_ATT) Proliferator or collision accident that stages a fake accident(SAT) rlieatr breaks the seal - Accident inspection is eluded
attempts to stage a fake accident (SI EAI) The accident inspection
that will break the seal SEAlThacietnscioby the inspector cannot detect that it
has been staged
- Optical surveillance is
eluded(OSE SYS) Optical
Proliferator attempts to repair - Proliferator reattach the wire surveillance does not detect that the
the broken seal of the E-cup seal proliferator repairs the broken seal
(SL_RPR_ATT) Proliferator - Proliferator reset the - Repairing broken seal is not
attempts to repair the seal that VACOSS seal detected by seal inspection
has been broken by them to (SLRPR D) Seal inspection does
access the material/system not detect that the seal was broken
and has been repaired
- Optical surveillance is eluded
Proliferator attempts to (OSESYS) Optical surveillanceropliferteron aemt tdoes not detect that the proliferator
(SlRPCATT) Proliferator Proliferator replace E-cup or replace the broken seal(SLpCA toreplac broeo VACOSS seal with a new - Replacing broken seal is not
attempts to replace the broken similar unit detected by seal inspection
seal that has been broken with a (SL_RPCD) Seal inspection does
not detect that the seal was broken
and has been replaced
- Seal inspector is eluded
(SI E SLI) Seal inspector does notProliferator attempts to modify - The seal inspector does not report that the seal has been broken
seal record (SRm ATT) report the correct record of the - Seal record modification is not
Proliferator attempts to modify state of the seal detected by seal inspection
the record of the state of the seal (SLRMD) Seal inspection does
during the inspection not detect that the seal record has
been modified
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3. Operation Monitoring
3.1 ID Tracking (ID)
Basic events descriptions of ID tracking success tree
Proliferator Tactic Specific Tactic Examples Sub-tree Events
Proliferator does not
attempt any tactic to ID Proliferator diverts the - ID tracking is eluded by designed
tracking (IDNO_ATT) material with small enough DA DS) ID tracking does not detect
Proliferator does not attempt amount per attempt such that the material diversion because of its
any tactic to prevent ID ID tracking has low probability detection efficiency
tracking from detecting the of detecting the diversion
diversion
-rOptical surveillance is eluded
Proliferator attempts to - Proliferator stages a fake (OSE-SYS) Optical surveillance does
break ID system by faking electrical system that cut the not detect that the proliferator stages a
an accident (IDFAATT) power to the ID tracking sensor fake accident
Proliferator attempts to stage - Proliferator stages a fake fire - Accident inspection is eluded
a fake accident that will break accident that break the ID (SIE AI) The accident inspection by
the functionality of the ID tracking device the inspector cannot detect that it has
tracking system been staged
- System optical surveillance is
eluded (OSESYS) Optical
surveillance does not detect that the
Proliferator attempts to proliferator tampers with the ID system
modify ID system detector! eetrhrwr
hardware (ID_DHMATT) Proliferator modifies the ID detector/hardware*System seal is eluded (5LESYS)
Proliferator attempts to detector to send a tracking Seal of the ID system does not show
modify the detector or signal without actually that it has been opened
hardware of the ID system, detecting the actual device -a Dte ha rdwre d i o
preventing it from detecting not detected by ID system
material diversion activity (IDDHMD) ID tracking system does
not detect that its detector/hardware has
been modified
- System optical surveillance is
eluded (OS_ESYS) Optical
Proliferator feed a fake surveillance does not detect that the
Proliferator attempts to detector signal to the proliferator tampers with the ID
modify ID system processing unit tracking processing system to modify
signal/data (IDSDMATT) - Proliferator modifies ID the signal/data
Proliferator attempts to - System seal is eluded (SLESYS)
modify the signal between ID system software to add or Seal of the ID system does not show
detector and the processing remove ID tracking record that it has been opened
unit or modify the record data modifies the stored ID tracking - Signal/data modification is not
to change the detection signal dife the se trcm detected by ID system (IDSDMD)data before the inspection ID tracking system signal and data
encryption does not detect that its
signal/data has been modified
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Proliferator Tactic Specific Tactic Examples Sub-tree Events
- Material optical surveillance is
Proliferator attempts to use Proliferator creates a fake ID eluded (OSEMAT) Optical
fake ID device device and put it through the surveillance does not detect that the
(IDFIDATT) Proliferator detector to fool the system that proliferator use a fake ID device
attempts to use a fake ID the it is the actual device attach - Use of fake ID device is not detected
device to fool the ID tracking the ti al by ID system(ID-FIDD) ID tracking
system system does not detect that the ID
device is fake one
MR fta
MR
MOVISENT
RECORDING
SYSTEM IS ELUDED
MRW
MOVEMET
RECORDING
SYDSTE ID ELUDED
WHILE WORKING
MRSDM
ME STTEM IS
ELUDED BY
SDIGAUDATA
MODIFICATION
MEDM ATT MRSDMD
MR SYSTEM
PROLIFERATOR SIGNAL/DATA
ATTETS MEDIFICATON 10
MODIFY ME NOT DETECTED
SYSTEM
DIGNAUDATA
OS E SYS SL E.SYS
I I7
SR OPTICAL SYSTR SEALSUEILANE
is ELUDEDUDE
MRFA
MDVEMENT
RECORDING
SSTEM IS NOT
WORKNG BY A
FAKE ACCIDENT
DS_E_ SS
SS OPTICAL
SURI.EIILNCE
10 ELUDED
Tre: MR.fta
Database: Safeguards.ped
ME
MR SYSTEM IS
ELUDED WITHOUT
PROLIFERArOR'S
TACTIC
MR NO ATT MRDS
PROLIF ORATGR MOVEMENT
DOES NOT RECORDING
ATTBTANY SYSTE IS
TACTiC TOM ( ELUDED9Y
SYSTE DESIGN
MR SDMD
IvCDIFICAIGN
DETECTED BY
MR SYSTEM
MRFAATT
PROUFERAT0R
EtM
ATTMPTS TO
SYSTEd BY
FAKING AN
ACCIDENT
I MRPT
MR SYSTEM-IS
ELUDED BY
PRO L'ERATaR S
TACTIC
S, Al
INPCTIONEIS
ELUDED
SLESYS
SYST24 SEAL IS
ELUDED
DS E SYS
DOSS OPTICALSSYEILLANCE
IS ELUDED
ME DHM D
DETECTORS
IIAIDWARE
)IEIIFICATIOH
0 
1
IS NOT
DETECTED BY
MR SYSTEM
114
MRDHM
YETEOTOR/HARDWARI
MODI dCATON
M HM_ ATT MRDHMD
PROLIFERATOR DErTECTORI
ATTdT TO AAOWAAE
MO DIl Y MR MODFICATION IS
SY STEM NOT DETECTED
D ETECTOR/
3.2 Movement Recording (MR)
Basic events descriptions of movement recording success tree
Proliferator Tactic Specific Tactic Examples Sub-tree Events
Proliferator does not attempt Proliferator diverts the - Movement recording is eluded
(MRNO ATT) Proliferator material with small enough by designed (MRDS) Movement
does not attempt any tactic to amount per attempt such that recording does not detect theprevent MRrmt dytcting the MR has low probability of material diversion because of itsprevent MR from detecting the detecting the diversion detection efficiencydiversion
Optical surveillance is eluded
Proliferator attempts to break Proliferator stages a fake (OSESYS) Optical surveillance
MR system by faking an electrical system that cut the does not detect that the proliferator
accident (MRFAATT) power to the MR system stages a fake accident
Proliferator attempts to stage a - Proliferator stages a fake fire - Accident inspection is eluded
fake accident that will break the accident that break the MR (SIEAI) The accident inspection
functionality of the MR system system hardware by the inspector cannot detect that it
has been staged
- System optical surveillance is
eluded (OSESYS) Optical
surveillance does not detect that the
Proliferator attempts to modify - Proliferator modifies the MR proliferator tampers with the MR
MR system detector/ hardware sensor to not send the system detector/hardware
(M _DHM_A TT) Proliferator movement signal ' System seal is eluded(MR(5L&ESYS) Seal of the MR system
attempts to modify the detector - Proliferator relocates the does not show that it has been
or hardware of the MR system, sensor, preventing it from oenoi
preventing it from detecting detecting the material opened
material diversion activity movement is not detected by MR system
(MR_DHM_D) MR tracking
system does not detect that its
detector/hardware has been modified
- System optical surveillance is
eluded (OS_ESYS) Optical
surveillance does not detect that the
- Proliferator feed a fake proliferator tampers with the MRProliferator attempts to modify detector signal to the tracking processing system to
MR system signal/data t modify the signal/data
(MRSDMATT) Prolif Proliferator modifies MR - System seal is eluded
attempts to modify the signal (SLE SYS) Seal of the MR system
between MR detector and the system software to add or does not show that it has been
processing unit or modify the remove movement record opened
record data to change the -oiferatores Mand - Signal/data modification is not
detection signal bmodifies the stred MR data detected by MR system
(MRSDMD) MR system signal
and data encryption does not detect
that its signal/data has been
modified
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3.3 Process Monitoring (PM)
Basic events descriptions of process monitoring success tree
Proliferator Tactic Specific Tactic Examples Sub-tree Events
Proliferator does not attempt Proliferator diverts the - Process monitoring is eluded by
(PMNO A TT) Proliferator material with small enough designed (PMDS) Process
does NO attempt any tactto amount per attempt such that monitoring does not detect the
prevent PM from detecting the PM has low probability of material diversion because of its
diversion detecting the diversion detection efficiency
- Optical surveillance is eluded
Proliferator attempts to break - Proliferator stages a fake (OS_ESYS) Optical surveillance
PM system by faking an electrical system that cut the does not detect that the proliferator
accident (PMFAATT) power to the PM system stages a fake accident
Proliferator attempts to stage a - Proliferator stages a fake fire - Accident inspection is eluded
fake accident that will break the accident that break the PM (SIEAI) The accident inspection
functionality of the PM system system hardware by the inspector cannot detect that it
has been staged
* System optical surveillance is
eluded(OSESYS) Optical
surveillance does not detect that the
Proliferator attempts to modify proliferator tampers with the PM
PM system detector/ hardware system detector/hardware
(PM DHM ATT) Proliferator - Proliferator modifies the PM - System seal is eluded
attempts to modify the detector sensor to send the expected (SL_ESYS) Seal of the PM system
o a reempts tomoif the M temr signal for current monitored does not show that it has been
or hardware of the PM system, processes openedpreventing it from detecting 
- Detector/Hardware modification
material diversion activity is not detected by PM system
(PMDHMD) PM tracking system
does not detect that its
detector/hardware has been modified
- System optical surveillance is
eluded (OSESYS) Optical
surveillance does not detect that the
- Proliferator feed a fake proliferator tampers with the PM
Proliferator attempts to modify detector signal to the processing system to modify the
PM system signal/data processing unit signal/data
(PMSDM_ATT) Proliferator - Proliferator modifies PM - System seal is eluded
attempts to modify the signal system software to record (SLESYS) Seal of the PM system
between PM detector and the expected process monitoring does not show that it has been
processing unit or modify the data opened
record data to change the - Proliferator access and - Signal/data modification is not
detection signal modifies the stored PM data detected by PM system
before the inspection (PMSDMD) PM system signal
and data encryption does not detect
that its signal/data has been
modified
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3.4 Safeguard by the Inspector (SI)
Basic events descriptions of safeguard by the inspector success tree
Proliferator Tactic Specific Tactic Examples Sub-tree Events
Proliferator does not attempt Proliferator diverts the material - Safeguard by the inspector is
any tactic to SI (SINOATT) with a scenario such that the eluded by designed (SIDS)
Proliferator does not attempt any probability o detectita the Safeguard by the inspector does
tactic to prevent SI from diversion by SI is low not detect the material diversion
detecting the diversion because of its detection efficiency
- Facility optical surveillance is
eluded (OS_E_- FAC) Facility
Proliferator attempts to fake an - Proliferator stages a radioactive optical surveillance does not
accident to prevent inspection material leak accident where the detect that the proliferator stages
(SIFAATT) Proliferator . a fake accident
attempts to stage a fake accident material has been diverted to Faking an accident to prevent
that prevents the inspector to prevent the inspector to collect a inspection is not detected by S
access and inspect certain areas sample or does an inspection (I nspect o de not
detect that the preventing accident
is staged by the proliferator
Proliferator bribes the inspector
to not report the material
Proliferator attempts to bribe diversion detection - Bribing the inspector is not
the inspector (SI BI ATT) - Proliferator bribes the inspector detected (SI_B1_D) Bribe is
Proliferator attempts to bribe the to collect sample from certain accepted by the inspector and the
inspector area inspection agency does not detect
- Proliferator bribes the inspector that the inspector has been bribed
to modify safeguard detection
record
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4. Environmental Sampling (ES)
Basic events descriptions of environmental sampling success tree
Proliferator Tactic Specific Tactic Examples Sub-tree Events
Proliferator does not attempt - Proliferator diverts the material - Environmental sampling is
any tactic to ES (ESNOATT) with small enough amount per eluded by designed (ESDS)
Proliferator does not attempt any attempt such that ES has low Environmental sampling does not
tactic to prevent ES from probability of detecting the detect the material diversion
detecting the diversion diversion because of its detection efficiency
Inspector sampling is eluded
Proliferator attempts to avoid Proliferator prevent the (SIE_RS) The inspector does not
random sampling inspector to collect a sample randomly collect sample from all
(ESARS_ATT) Proliferator from the areas that are in the parts of the facility inside theMBA
attempts to prevent the parts of material diversion pathway Avoiding random sampling is
facility that are in the material - Proliferator prepared a sample not detected by ES (ESARS D)
diversion pathway from being or have a designated area for the nonetal s aARsis
randomly collect by the inspector inspector to collect a sample Environmental sampling analysis
does not detect that the sample is
not randomly collected
- Sample seal is eluded
(SLESP) Seal of the sample
container does not show that it has
Proliferator attempts to modify - Proliferator swap the sample been opened
tie sample (ES SM ATT) during the site inspection after it - Inspector monitoring is eluded
thersle ateSmtt has been randomly collected by (SIESM) The inspector whoProliferator attempts to replace or the inspector monitor the sample does not detect
modify the sample after it has - Proliferator swap the sample the sample modificationbeen randomly collected by the during its transit from the site to - Sample modification is notinspector the inspection agency laboratory detected by ES (ESSMD)
Environmental sampling analysis
does not detect that the sample has
been modified
- Optical surveillance is eluded
(OS_E_FAC) Optical
surveillance does not detect that
Proliferator attempts to clean - Proliferator remove the the proliferator tries to clean up
up material traces radiation traces of the diverted the material traces
(ESCMTATT) Proliferator material in the diversion - Cleaning up material traces
attempts to clean up the traces of materal does is not detected by ES
material diversion activities pathway (ESCMT_D) Environmental
sampling analysis does not detect
that the proliferator tries to clean
up the material traces
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4. Portal Monitoring (PTM)
Basic events descriptions of portal monitoring success tree
Proliferator Tactic Specific Tactic Examples Sub-tree Events
Proliferator does not attempt Proliferator diverts the material - Portal Monitoring is eluded by
any tactic to PTM i with small enough amount per designed (PTMDS) Portal
does not attempt any tactic to attempt such that PTM has low monitoring does not detect theprevent PtMfm dytecting the probability of detecting the material diversion because of itsprevent PTM from detecting the diversion detection efficiencydiversion
- System optical surveillance is
Proliferator attempts to break - Proliferator stages a fake eluded (OSESYS) Optical
PTM system by faking an electrical system that cut the surveillance does not detect that
accident (PTM.FA.ATT) power to the PTM system the proliferator stages a fake
Proliferator attempts to stage a - Proliferator stages a fake fire accident
fake accident that will break the accident that break the PTM - Accident inspection is eluded
functionality of the PTM system system hardware (SIpE_ bAI) The accident
inspection by the inspector cannot
detect that it has been staged
- System optical surveillance is
eluded(OSESYS) Optical
surveillance does not detect that
Proliferator attempts to modify the proliferator tampers with the
PTM system detector/ PTM system detector/hardware
hardware (PTM DHMATT) Proliferator modifies the PTM - System seal is eluded
Proliferator attempts to modify sensor to send the expected (SLESYS) Seal of the PTM
the detector or hardware of the signal for current monitored system does not show that it has
PTM system, preventing it from processes been opened
detecting material diversion - Detector/Hardware
activity modification is not detected byPM system (PTM_DHM_D)
PTM tracking system does not
detect that its detector/hardware
has been modified
- System optical surveillance is
eluded (OSESYS) Optical
surveillance does not detect that
the proliferator tampers with the
Proliferator attempts to modify - Proliferator feed a fake detector PTM processing system to modify
PTM system signal/data signal to the processing unit the signal/data
(PTMSDM_ATT) Proliferator - Proliferator modifies PTM - System seal is eluded
attempts to modify the signal system software to record (SLESYS) Seal of the PTM
between PTM detector and the expected portal monitoring data system does not show that it has
processing unit or modify the - Proliferator access and been opened
record data to change the modifies the stored PTM data - Signal/data modification is not
detection signal before the inspection detected by PTM system
(PTMSDMD) PTM system
signal and data encryption does
not detect that its signal/data has
been modified
124
Proliferator Tactic Specific Tactic Examples Sub-tree Events
- Facility optical surveillance is
eluded (OSEFAC) Facility
Proliferator places the diverted optical surveillance does not
Proliferator attempts to use material inside a iron, carbon detect that the proliferator place
shielding container steel, or stainless steel container shielding container before going
(PTMSCATT) Proliferator to shield the gamma ray and through PTM system
attempts to use shielding neutron radiation from the - Using shielding container is
container to shield the diverted diverted material not detected by PTM system
material from being detected by Proliferator places the diverted (PTM-SC-D) PTM system does
the portal monitoring system material with a heat sink to not detect that the proliferator use
absorb the heat from the material a shielding container to prevent
detection of the diverted material
Appendix B: Safeguard Schemes in Nuclear Facilities
Nuclear Enrichment Facility
Fuel Enrichment Facility Type: Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (GCEP), Gaseous Diffusion, and
Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS). Material: 3-5% U-235 in the form of UF 6.
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Containment and Surveillance
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Weight Inspection
Process Monitoring
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Material Balance Area Nuclear Material Safeguards
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Gamma Ray Spectrometry
MBA3:Product Storage Area Depleted U Neutron Counter
Destructive Analysis
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Containment and Surveillance
Throughout Facility Diverted Material Environmental Sampling
Portal Monitoring
Key Measurement Point (KMP)
Inventory KMP Flow KMP
* KMP-A: UF 6 Cylinder Storage e KMP- 1: Receipt of Feed UF 6 Cylinder
* KMP-B: UF 6 Enrichment Process e KMP-2: Transfer of UF 6 Cylinder between MBA1 and MBA2
" KMP-C: Depleted U Storage e KMP-3: Shipment of Product UF6 Cylinder
* KMP-4: Transfer of Depleted U between MBA2 and MBA3
* KMP-5: Shipment of Depleted U
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Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Facility
Fuel Fabrication Facility Type:
- Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) Fuel
Material: 3-5% U-235 in the form of UF6cylinder, fuel pellet, rod and assembly
- Mixed Oxide (MOX) /Transuranic (TRU)
Material: MOX/TRU in the form of MOX/TRU canister, fuel pellet, rod and assembly
Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Facility
MBA1 MBA2
Powder Pellet -- IIR m1
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Strg I KMP-2 KMP-B3 KMP-C NCStorage NC
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Material Balance Area Nuclear Material Safeguards
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Throughout Facility Diverted Material Environmental Sampling
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Key Measurement Point (KMP)
Inventory KMP Flow KMP
" KMP-A: UF6 Cylinder/MOX Canister e KMP-1: Receipt of Feed UF6 Cylinder/MOX Canister
Storage e KMP-2: Transfer of UF6 Cylinder/MOX Canister
" KMP-B: Powder Preparation Process between MBAl and MBA2
" KMP-C: Pellet Fabrication Process e KMP-3: Transfer of Fuel Assembly between MBA2
" KMP-D: Fuel Rod Fabrication Process and MBA3
" KMP-E: Fuel Assembly Storage * KMP-4: Transfer of Solid Waste between MBA2 and
* KMP-F: Solid Waste Storage MBA4
a KMP-5: Shipment of Fuel Assembly
e KMP-6: Shipment of Solid Waste
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Nuclear Reactor
Reactor Type
- Light Water Reactor (LWR)
Material: 3-5% U-235 fuel assembly, Pu in the spent fuel assembly
- Heavy Water Reactor (HWR)
Material: Low or un-enriched U-235 fuel assembly, Pu in the spent fuel assembly
- Fast Breeder Reactor (FR)
Material: MOX or Metal (U-Pu-Zr) fuel assembly and spent fuel
- Research Reactor (RR)
Material: Highly enrich U-235 fuel assembly, Pu in the spent fuel assembly
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C/SiPTILES
Material Balance Area Nuclear Material Safeguards
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MBA4:Dry Cask Storage Area Spent Fuel Assembly Destructive Analysis
ID Tracking
Weight Inspection
Heat Inspection
Containment and Surveillance
Throughout Facility Diverted Material Environmental Sampling
Portal Monitoring
Key Measurement Point (KMP)
Inventory KMP Flow KMP
* KMP-A: Fresh Fuel Assembly Storage e KMP-1: Receipt of Feed Fresh Fuel Assembly
" KMP-B: Reactor Core * KMP-2: Transfer of Fresh Fuel Assembly between
" KMP-C: Spent Fuel Pool MBA1 and MBA2
" KMP-D: Dry Cask Storage e KMP-3: Transfer of Spent Fuel Assembly between
MBA2 and MBA3
* KMP-4: Transfer of Spent Fuel Assembly between
MBA3 and MBA4
9 KMP-5: Shipment of Spent Fuel Assembly
* KMP-6: Shipment of Spent Fuel Assembly
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Nuclear Reprocessing Facility
Fuel Reprocessing Facility Type: Aqueous (PUREX), Pyroprocessing
Material: U/Pu/MOX spent fuel, Plutonium, Uranium, Uranium Oxide and MOX
Nuclear Reprocessing Facility (Aqueous - Oxide Fuel)
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Material Balance Area Nuclear Material Safeguards
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ID Tracking
Process Monitoring
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Material Balance Area Nuclear Material Safeguards
Optical Surveillance
Seal
MBA5: Product Storage Area MOX Gamma Ray SpectrometryUOX Neutron Counter
Weight Inspection
ID Tracking
Optical Surveillance
Throughout Facility Diverted Material Environmental Sampling
Portal Monitoring
Key Measurement Point (KMP)
Inventory KMP Flow KMP
" KMP-A: Spent Fuel Storage * KMP- 1: Receipt of Spent Fuel Assembly
" KMP-B: Chopping and Dissolution e KMP-2: Transfer of Spent Fuel from MBAI to MBA2
Process e KMP-3: Transfer of Waste from MBA1 to MBA3
e KMP-C: Chemical Separation Process * KMP-4: Transfer of Waste from MBA2 to MBA3
" KMP-D: Pu Purification Process e KMP-5: Transfer of Pu from MBA2 to MBA4
" KMP-E: U Purification Process o KMP-6: Transfer of U from MBA2 to MBA4
* KMP-F: U Denitration Process o KMP-7: Transfer of UOX from MBA2 to MBA5
" KMP-G: Waste Process and Storage * KMP-8: Transfer of MOX from MBA4 to MBA5
" KMP-H: Co-Denitration Process o KMP-9: Transfer of Waste from MBA4 to MBA3
" KMP-I: MOX Storage * KMP-10: Shipment of MOX
" KMP-J: UOX Storage * KMP- 1l: Shipment of UOX
o KMP-12: Shipment of Waste
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Appendix C: Elicitation Questionnaire
SFR - DOE/NERI Project - Elicitation Process for Safeguard Evaluation MIT, Summer 2010
Elicitation Process for Safeguard Evaluation
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Summer 2010
Contact emails and authors:
Edoardo Cavalieri d'Oro edofmit.edu
Chonlagarn lamsumang kci 6mi t.edu
This elicitation is an integral part of the of the project "Risk-Informed Balancing of Safety, Non-
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Introduction and Success Tree Methodology
Introduction
We have developed a three-part elicitation process that can be used to estimate the probabilities of
the events populating typical diversion scenarios, in order to evaluate the safeguards in a nuclear
facility.
A typical diversion scenario is driven by an actor that we are going to call the proliferator. His goal is
the concealed acquisition of attractive nuclear materials from the plant's site. In order to succeed, or
successfully complete the scenario he envisions, he is in general required to simultaneously complete
two actions: acquiring the material and avoiding detection. While the first action requires that the
proliferator is a person working within the plant and with knowledge about the plant's procedures,
the second action requires the proliferator to elude the safeguards that are designed to prevent his
acquisition attempt. The probabilities associated with this second type of action are the focus of the
present elicitation process. In order to determine these probabilities, it is necessary to interview
personnel familiar with the safeguards and this is where we ask for your contribution.
Before describing in detail the probabilities and the characteristics of the safeguard that we would
like to estimate with you, we ask you to first familiarize with some basic probability concepts and in
particular the methodology that has been developed in order to simulate the proliferation pathways
within a given Nuclear Energy System (NES).
Methodoloay
The diagram in the next page shows the details of the methodology that has been developed in order
to capture the attempt of a proliferator trying to acquire weapon usable materials (WUM) from a
given location within the boundaries of a nuclear facility. The method is called "Success Tree" and it
adopts the topology of the fault trees commonly used for safety analyses (i.e. Probabilistic Risk
Assessment). The tree decomposes the actions required to acquire the WUM by combining the
probabilities of single events assuming they are independent. To each event, portrayed in the
diagram as a box, is then associated a probability. Such a probability is obtained by combining the
Basic Event (BE) probabilities, portrayed as circles in the lowest level of the diagram. The top event
in the upper part of the diagram is thus finally calculated by simple math, once all the basic events in
the lowest part of the diagram have been determined. However, no experimental data are available
for the basic events, and their value can only determined by an estimation based on the judgment of a
person that is familiar with each of the detection systems in the selected NES.
The following page shows the structure of the success tree for the example case of a Neutron Counter
(NC) 1 used to determine the amount of plutonium within a solvent circulating at a given location of
the selected NES.
We will use this example throughout the document to explain our elicitation process in detail. The appendices at the end of
the documnent contain all the information and questionnaire related to the safeguard of current interest
2
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Figure 1. Portion of the success tree method referring to the probability to elude a neutron counter.
The Success Tree diagram in the above figure describes the pathway that a proliferator has to follow
in order to succeed in his acquisition attempt. The acquisition attempt depends on the Proliferator's
capability to elude all the safeguards in place at a given location. Eluding the safeguard in this case
means to elude all the measurements resulting from the safeguard scheme present in a selected
location of the NES, or Material Balance Area (MBA). The top event, labeled "NC is eluded," represents
the capability to elude a neutron counter (NC), which depends on two main factors. The first factor to
consider is that, depending on the quantity of material subtracted, the safeguard might not be able to
detect it even in the absence of additional tactics. This is the case when the proliferator acquires an
amount of material that is below the threshold at which the instrument detects the presence of a
given material (e.g. the amount of plutonium nitrate flowing in a pipe). The probability associated
with this event, labeled as 'no tactic', can be inferred by knowing the accuracy of the safeguard. This
means that the proliferator, assuming he knows the threshold of the instrument, does not need to
produce an ad hoc tactic specifically intended for this safeguard.
The determination of the basic event (circle) labeled as "NC is eluded without proliferator's tactics" is
the first basic event that has to be determined by our elicitation process. Thus, the first question is
asking you to determine the uncertainty of measurement of the detector.
In the case that the amount of material is within the range of detection of this instrument, the
proliferator then needs to add an additional tactic selected from the four supportive tactics labeled
from A to D in the left lower portion of the tree. Each one of these tactics represents a specific attack
on the detection system, a portion of it, or on the sample. Tactic A for instance, expanded with a sub
tree on the right, depicts the situation where the proliferator adds dummy materials to the sample in
order to elude the NC's measurements and mask the illicit subtraction of material. In order to be
undetected, the proliferator needs to support this strategy with further actions covering this extra
action, such as eluding seals and optical surveillance (diamonds).
3
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The determination of the basic event (circle) labeled as "using dummy material is not detected by
NC" is the second basic event that has to be determined by our elicitation process. This second
question is asking you to determine the potential vulnerability of the detector to the threats from A
to D. Note that the four threats, or tactics, listed in the above diagram are specific for eluding a
neutron counter. The list of tactics will be different depending on the type of safeguard.
In conclusion, there are 5 basic event probabilities that need to be derived from the elicitation as
summarized by Table 1.
Table 1. Basic Event probabilities and tactics for a neutron counter
Tactic Basic Event Probability Tactic Description
Depending on the neutron counter
Probability that the proliferator will uncertainty of measurement, proliferator
No Tactic successfully elude the neutron diverts the material in an amount that is
counter without any tactics within the expected error of the
measurement
Probability that the proliferator will Proliferator replaces the missing material
Tactic A successfully elude the neutron with another neutron source, such as minor
counter by using dummy material actinides or fission products
Probability that the proliferator will Proliferator places compensating materialProbabiflty tht the pieraor w with the same mass as that diverted in the
Tactic B successfully elude the neutron . detection region, such as on the surface of the
counter by placing compensating pipe, or between the container and the
material in the detection region detector.
Probability that the proliferator will Proliferator modifies the detector to give
Tactic C successfully elude the neutron more neutron counts than normal, or
counter by modifying the hardware modifies the electronic circuit to send more
signals to the processing unit.
Probability that the proliferator will Proliferator modifies the software to store
Tactic D successfully elude the neutron the desired output or access the record to
counter by modifying the software modify the data.
In some cases, it is possible that your expertise might be more useful to address the first three items
presented in the above diagram. In general it is expected that a person dealing with a specific
safeguard might not be aware of software related problems or he might not have been personally
involved in the definition of counter measures to protect the hardware components of the detector
from being manipulated. It is therefore suggested to either try to qualitatively address the questions
or to pass the question to your colleagues, teammates, or people in your company that might have a
specific capability to address these issues.
Factors affecting the probabilities and the uncertainty estimates
At this point it should be clear that the scope of the elicitation process is to determine the
probabilities of the boxes labeled "no tactic" which refers to the accuracy of the safeguard system and
the four remaining probabilities, labeled tactics "A", "B", "C", and "D", which refer to the probabilities
to elude the detection system in question via its vulnerabilities to four types of threats, or tactics.
The uncertainty of measurement and the probabilities values expressing the vulnerability of a
safeguard to the four threats are all expressed by means of a point estimate and a judgment about
your uncertainty in providing that estimate. So in the second part of the elicitation process you will
be asked to quantitatively provide estimates of these values accompanied by the level of confidence
of your subjective evaluation.
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In addition, these estimates in the framework we have envisioned are not independent but a function
of other variables:
* The uncertainty of measurement is a function of the mass of the material that is being
measured (M), and also a function of the resources that you devote to your safeguard, or its
final cost (C).
* The vulnerability measured in terms of the proliferator's probability to succeed with tactics
is a function of the overall safeguard cost (C).
The scope of the first part of the elicitation process is to determine the plausible ranges of the
variables on which uncertainty and vulnerability depend, In this first part of the elicitation process'
you are asked to provide a range for the dependent variables M and C, while in the second part you
will be asked to provide estimates of the probabilities and uncertainty associated with these ranges.
Within the range, the base case of M, which is the regular mass flow of the material at the safeguard
location, will be determined from the facility design. On the other hand, the base case of C, which is
the expected regular cost of the safeguard, will be defined with you during the phone interview. The
definitions of the upper and lower limits, and base cases for the two dependent variables M, and C,
are provided in the following table.
Table 2. Factors affecting the probabilities and the uncertainty estimates.
Point on the detectable range
Factor
Point Description
M1,. Lowest total mass in the detectable range
Total mass of the material M Base case total mass, which is the regular mass of
under detection M material under detection region in the facility
Mhisa Highest total mass in the detectable range
Cmin Minimum cost of the safeguard for it to operate
Base case cost, which is the regular cost of typical
Cost of the neutron counter Ce set up of the safeguard
Cost of the safeguard the will make it operate at the
optimal efficiency
Following this section, the document will show the elicitation process separated into three parts
using a neutron counter as the example safeguard. For specific details of the safeguard of current
interest, please see Appendix A3.
'The reason for not having these two phases of the elicitation process together is that in order to establish a comparison
between your estimates and the estimates provided fron other people who have expertise in the same safeguard, we have to
define a range that is the same for all the interviewees.
3 Appendix A contains the description of the safeguard and facility that have been selected, including all the details regarding
potential diversion scenarios occurring at ste safeguard location of that facility.
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PART I: Phone Interview and Preparation for the Questionnaire
The objective of this first part of the elicitation process is to discuss with you the details of the
safeguard's functionality, its components, and its limitations. The information provided by you
during a phone interview will help us to prepare for the second part of the elicitation process, which
is going to be in the form of a written questionnaire. During the conversation we will ask you to help
us determine some characteristics of the safeguard relative to the specific application we are looking
at (i.e. acquisition of materials from a given location within a pre-selected facility). Specifically these
characteristics are: the safeguard detection range, such as the amount of material that it can detect,
and the cost of the safeguard for different setup and components.
In this first part of the elicitation process, you are asked to provide a range for the dependent
variables, mass of the material under detection (M) and the cost of the safeguard (C) for scenarios
with and without proliferator tactics.
The total time for the phone interview is estimated to be approximatelv 30 minutes.
The following table shows the example questions and inputs for the neutron counter. For the specific
questions relating to the safeguard of current interest, please see Appendix B.
Point on the detectable mass range
Factor
Point Value (kg)
Mw 0.1
Total mass of the material Mac 0.5
under detection
The cost of the safeguard for the scenario without proliferator's tactic is the cost of different
safeguard set-ups that affect the uncertainty of measurement.
Safeguard Safeguard modifications (e.g.,
Tactics Estimated Value equipment changes, component
Cost additions, quality improvements,
software interfaces, etc.)
Cmin $0.05M Basic He-3 detector tube
No tactic: Uncertainty of Cbc $0.2M Larger detector, charge amplifier
measurement
Copt $1M Multiple highest sensitivity detectors
The cost of the safeguard for the scenario with proliferator's tactic is the cost of different safeguard
set-ups that affect the proliferator success probability to elude the safeguard for each specific tactic.
Safeguard Safeguard modifications (e.g.,
Tactics Estiated Value equipment changes, componentTactics Estte Vau additions, quality improvenments,
software interfaces, etc.)
CA mm $0.05M Basic He-3 detector tube
Tactic A: Dummy material CAAoc $0.2M Larger detector, charge amplifier
CA,Vt $1M Multiple highest sensitivity detectors
Cmtin $0.05M Basic He-3 detector tube
Tactic B: Compensating material CH'be- $0.2M Larger detector, charge amplifier
C__ _ _ _ $1M Multiple highest sensitivity detectors
Tactic C: Hardware modification Ccmi $0.05M Basic detector and cable setup
6
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Safeguard Safeguard modifications (e.g.,
Tactics Estimated Value equipment changes, component
Cost additions, quality improvements,
Csoftware interfaces, etc.)
Ccj., $0.5M Detector and cable shielding
Ccm $2M Movement and tampering sensor
Ca.nn $0.05M Basic software setup
Tactic D: Software manipulation Cot $0.1M Software and data encryption
CDot $0.5M Real time authentication and remote
central server
PART H: Quantitative Questionnaire
The objective of the second part of the assessment is to acquire the estimates of the probabilities that
the proliferator will succeed in eluding the safeguard.
As shown by the Success Tree method, there are two ways to elude the safeguard:
" Without recourse to supportive tactics:
o The probability is inferred through the uncertainty of measurement of the safeguard.
o The uncertainty of measurement is a function of the material mass (M), and of the amount of
resources spent for the safeguard, or cost (C).
" With the use supportive tactics:
o The probability is directly expressed in terms of probability of success for the proliferator
attempting the attack.
o These probabilities are functions of the amount of resource spent for the safeguard, or cost (C).
You might recall that in the first part of the assessment you were asked to provide ranges for the two
variables M, and C. At the same time we asked other professionals to provide the same ranges and we
averaged the values provided by you with the value provided by these other experts. Therefore in the
tables thatyou are asked to complete, you will not find exactly the range values that you provided in
the first part of the elicitation process. However, the new values won't differ much from the values
you gave us and therefore you should be able to proceed with this assessment.
In this part you will be asked to estimate the uncertainty of measurement and the probabilities to
elude the safeguard system that you are familiar with and also provide the level of confidence for
your estimates.
The total time for the Questionnaire is estimated to be apgroximatelv 1 hour.
Two preliminary examples are provided below so that you can familiarize yourself with the
assessment. The two examples show how the probability and uncertainty of measurement curves are
built based on the estimates and confidence levels provided by a hypothetical interviewee. The
questionnaire is designed specifically for a neutron counter. For the questionnaire relating to the
current safeguard of interest, please see Appendix C.
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Question I The neutron counter uncertainty of measurement
The question in the table is asking for the uncertainty of measurement with 95% level of confidence
at three different points of total mass under detection and cost of the safeguard. The cost and mass
ranges and the base case estimates are provided in the table both for M and C. The following figure
shows the plots of the estimates for comparison.
Safeguard Uncertainty of Measurement (%) with 95% confidence level
Estimated Cost Total Mass Mt,,= 1kg Total Mass M = 5kg Total Mass M15h = 10kg
C,,= $0,05M 10 4 2.5
C1 =$0.1m 4 2 1.5
= $1M 2 1 0.75
12 -
-10
4)
E 8
4
0
0
0
1o
2.5
22
1 0.75
2 8 10
CmIn = $005M
W "Cbc= $02M
WCopt=$1M
12
Total Material Mass - M (kg)
Figure 2. Example plot of total material mass versus uncertainty of measurement at three different
costs of safeguard setups for a neutron counter.
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Question II: Probability that the proliferator's tactics will successfully elude the neutron
counter
Tactic A Using Dummy Material
The question in the table is askingfor the proliferator success probability point estimate and the
error with 95% level of confidence at three different points of the cost of the safeguard. The cost
range and the base case estimates are provided in the table. The following figure shows the plots of
the estimate as a function of the cost of the safeguard.
0.
0.
0.c
0
S0.
rA
S0.
Cn
0.
0.
0.
Proliferator success probability of tactic A
Safeguard Estimated
Cost Point Estimate ± Error with 95% Level
of Confidence
= $0.05M 0.75 0.1
Cebc = $0.2M 0.4 0.05
CAopp= $1M 0.2 0.02
1~
9
7 7
6
5
2 012 Tactic.A
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.2
Cost of the Safeguard ($Millions)
Figure 3. Example plot of the proliferator success probability versus the cost of the safeguards.
The expected trend of the proliferator success probability versus the cost of the safeguard is
decreasing until it reaches the saturation point where increasing the cost of the safeguard will no
longer anymore decrease the success probability of the proliferator.
Following the same template, the rest of the questionnaire for the other tactics will have similar
format as the one shown for tacticA
9
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PART I: Aggregation of Inputs and Feedbacks
The objective of the third part of the assessment is to analyze and aggregate the inputs from the
questionnaires, and then show these results to you before the final interview to receive your
feedback.
T he total time tbr the phone interview is estimated to be an proximatelv 3 minutes,
The main analysis of the inputs is to compare the proliferator success probabilities for the different
tactics that can be used to elude the safeguard. Figure 4 shows the example plot of proliferator
success probabilities versus the cost of the safeguard for different proliferator's tactics. This plot
shows the cost effectiveness of the set up of the safeguard to prevent the proliferator from eluding
the safeguard by each tactic (Please note that the actual comparison of the proliferator success
probability will include the probability of eluding the supporting safeguard, such as surveillance
camera, seal, etc., as show in the success tree diagram in Figure 1)
1
095
0.85
075
0-
0ACn
CD
lTactic A
0.3J
- 03 0Tactic B
0.2 0.25 0.2 Tactic c
0.1 0.1 0.1 Tactic D
0 05
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Cost of the Safeguard ($Millions)
Figure 4. Example plot of comparison of proliferator success probabilities of different tactics
Next, the inputs from different sources are aggregated. We are using the linear opinion pool
approach with equal weight, shown by Clemen and Winkler4, the result is the average of the values
from all experts.
p(C,)= wi (C )
-1
p = the proliferator success probability
C,= the safeguard cost
w= the weighting factor; in this case w, =
Robert T. Clemen and Robert L, Winider, "Combining Probability Distributions Prom Experts in Risk Analysis". Risk Analysis,
Vol.t19, No. 2,1999
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Because we have defined the points on the range of the variable M and C prior to the questionnaire
during the first interview, the estimates of the uncertainty of measurement and the proliferator
success probabilities are at the same value of the factors. This provides better comparison and
aggregation of the inputs from different sources.
Figure 5 shows an example plot of uncertainty of measurement from different inputs and the
aggregated values using this method.
14 1.5 4 Expert A
9 Expert 8
1.083
1 Expertc
x Aggregated Result
8 10 12
Total Material Mass - M (kg)
Figure 5. Example plot of the aggregated inputs for the uncertainty of measurement with C = $0.2M
The results from the analysis will be sent to you, prior the phone interview for a discussion about the
issues that may come up and to receive your feedbacks of the outcome of the assessment. You will
also have an opportunity to adjust your inputs if you found necessary during the interview.
Summary
In summary, this document demonstrates the step-by-step procedures and example inputs of our
elicitation process using neutron counter as the example safeguard. We would like to thank you for
reading through the document and we hope that this document provides enough information and
explanation for you to complete our interview and questionnaire. In the appendices, you will find the
descriptions and the questionnaire for the safeguard of current interest.
Ifvou have any questions or ifvou are ready to set up a time for the phone interview please contact:
kciOmitedu
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APPENDIX A: Description of Neutron Counter in an Aqueous Reprocessing Plant
The following des cription is provided for the estimation of the probability that the proliferator will
succeed in eluding the neutron counters in the chemical separation process area of an aqueous
reprocessing plant
FociItfy
The scheme below shows the flow of the material and the safeguards scheme in an Aqueous Fuel
Reprocessing Facility (ARF). The processes of this facility are separated into five material balance
areas (MBA) where the material flows in and out of the areas are measured for material accountancy.
Each MBA contains different types of safeguards that are suitable for the processes and form of the
material within the area. The safeguards are located at the Key Measurement Points (KMP)
throughout the facility There are two types of KMP; one is Inventory Key Measurement Point
(IKMP), where the safeguards monitor the material inside the process or storage. The other type is
Flow Key Measurement Point (FKMP), where the safeguards monitor the amount of material
transferring between two processes.
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Figure 6. Schematic of the processes and safeguards schemes in an aqueous reprocessing plant.
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Facility Data (based on Rokkasho Reprocessing Plants)
- Reprocessing capacity for light water reactor (LWR) spent fuel: 800 tons/year
- Expected operating days per year: 200
- Normal daily operation throughput: 4 tons/day
- Plutonium product in the form of MDX powder: 8 tons/year (40kg/day)
- The main process employs a PUREX type separation process for the removal of fission
products and the partitioning and purification of uranium and plutonium.
- Approximate contents of the spent fuel at 50GWd/MTIHM burnup are given below(
Table 3. Spent fuel composition from a LWR.
50 GWd/MTlHM irradiated oxide fuel % of Content
Uranium93.4% (1.1% U-235)
Plutonium 1.33%
Minor Actinides 0.12%
Fission Products 5.15%
Material Balance Area
The details of the safeguards in the chemical separation area (MBA2) are shown in Figure 7.
PM eutnatoet
NC Neaulmfi Ibiase
DA I
MBA2 C/s
Spent Fuel Storage Chemical
Separation
* SNIP-C
Wastestorage Pu
Purification UPurification U Denitration
<, IGP-D SKMP-E KMP-F
--Vsp-------------
P e
co-denitration Area
Figure 7. Schematic of the processes and safeguards schemes at MBA2.
5S. J. Johnson, H. Higuchi, K. Fujimald, "Developmentof the Safeguards Approach for the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant",
International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA-SM-367/8/01.
I Xu, Zhiwen, "Design Strategies for Op timizing High Burnup Fuel in Pressurized Water Reactors", MIT Department of Nuclear
Engineering doctoral thesis, January 2003.
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There are three major safeguard systems within the MBA2.
1. Solution Measurement and Monitoring System (SMMS): SMMS is an in-tank measurement
system used for the determination of solution level, volume and density, from a combination
of data of pressure measurement device (Electromanometer), temperature sensor, and
neutron detector.
2. Automatic SamplingAuthentication System (ASAS): ASAS authenticates the sampling jug and
the taking and transferring of samples from the operator's process sampling benches to the
inspector's On-Site Laboratory (OSL) for sample analysis.
3. Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence (NRF): NRF is a new active interrogation technique that is
currently proposed to be used for material accountancy before and after the chemical
separation process. The technique relies on the detection of unique photon energies of
resonance fluorescence from excited nuclides.
On top of these systems the area is monitored by containment and surveillance (C/S) systems.
Safeuard Seup
5MM5 Processing Unit
.. ... . ... 
Cheiaical5c-paratice and
Output Accountability Tank (OAT)
/ I
Figure 8. Setup of the neutron counter at the Output Accountability Tank (OAT)
Figure 8 and Table 4 show the setup and the information about the neutron detector as part of SMMS
in Material Balance Area 2. The neutron detector is used to account for the amount of neutron
radiation from plutonium nitrate in the Output Accountability Tank after the chemical separation and
purification processes. The data from the detector is then compared with the reference signature and
raises alarms in case of differences. This will effectively detect the proliferator's attempts to divert
some amount of plutonium during the earlier processes, since the amount of the plutonium detected
will not match the expected value within the allowable tolerance.
Table 4. Information about the neutron detector in MBA2 as part of SMMS.
Type: Helurn-3 proportional detectors
System: Solution Measurement and Monitoring System (SMMS)
Location: Output Accountability Tank
Material Under Detection: Plutonium in a plutonium nitrate solution
14
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The material detected by the neutron detector is the plutonium in plutonium nitrate solution. The
approximate plutonium isotope composition and neutron radiation is shown in the table below.
Please note that the total mass the material under detection (M) in the questionnaire is the total mass
of plutonium inside the detection region.
Table 5. Plutonium isotope composition and neutron radiation for a sample at MBA2.
Plutonium % Isotope Neutron Radiation Neutron Radiation of 1kg of
Isotope Composition (N/kg.s) Plutonium (N/s)
Pu-238 2 .50/6 2.67E+06 6.68E+04
Pu-239 55.00% 2.30E+01 1.27E+01
Pu-240 24.00% 1.03E+06 2.47E+05
Pu-241 14.00% 4.94E+01 6.92E+00
Pu-242 4.50% 1.73E+06 7.79E+04
Total 100.00% 5.43E+06 3.92E+05
The following figure shows the portion of the success tree model for a neutron counter (as explained
by the example in the first section of the document, see Figure 1).
Accuracy of
Measurernent
(No Tactic)
MactiA
Tactic A
Basic ern toNCISELUDEDBY PAONG NCISEWDEDBY NC IWDEDBY
COMPENSATINGMATEIIALN HARDWARE SOFTWAR
DETECTDN REGION MODIFICAON MOIFCADON
Tactic B Tactic C Tactic D
Vulnerabilties to specific threat/tactics
Figure 9. Portion of the success tree method referring to the probability to elude a neutron counter.
The following table contains the description of the basic events and proliferator's tactic to elude the
safeguard for a neutron counter (as explained by the example in the first section of the document, see
Table 1).
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Table 6. Basic Event probabilities and tactics for a neutron counter
Tactic Basic Event Probability Tactic Description
Probability that the prolifeirator will Depending on the neutron counter uncertainty of
No Tactic successfully elude the neutron counter measurement, proliferator diverts the material in
without any tactics an amount that is within the expected error of the
measurement
Probability that the proliterator will Proliferator replaces the missing material with
Tactic A successfully elude the neutron counter another neutron source, such as minor actinides or
by using dummy material fission products
Probability that the proliferator will Proliferator places compensating material with the
successfully elude the neutron counter same mass as that diverted in the detection region,
Tactic 8 by placing compensating material in the such as on the surface of the pipe, or between the
detection region container and the detector.
Proliferator modifies the detector to give moreProbability that the proliferator will neutron counts than normal, or modifies theTactic C successfully elude the neutron counter electronic circuit to send more signals to theby modifying the hardware processing unit.
Probability that the proliferator will Proliferator modifies the software to store the
Tactic D successfully elude the neutron counter desired output or access the record to modify the
by modifying the software data.
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APPENDIX B: Questions for the Phone Interview
The following tables show the values that will be acquired from the discussion during the phone
interview for Part I of the elicitation process for neutron counter. The details of the neutron counter
setup and the material under detection are shown in the 'Safeguard Setup" Section of Appendix A.
To Point on the detectable mass range
Factor I
Point Value
Total mass of the material
under detection Mbc
Mhgh
For the cost of the safeguard, please provide the details of the physical changes that correspond to
each of the following points of each proliferator's tactic scenarios. The cost of the safeguard for the
scenario without proliferator's tactic is the cost of different safeguard set-ups that affect the
uncertainty of measurement.
Safeguard Safeguard modifications (e.g,
Tactics Estimated Value equipment changes, component
cost additions, quality improvements,
software interfaces, etc.)
Cmin
No tactic: Uncertainty of C
measurement
clpt
The cost of the safeguard for the scenario with proliferator's tactic is the cost of different safeguard
set-ups that affect the proliferator success probability to elude the safeguard for each specific tactic
Safeguard Safeguard modifications (e.g.,
Tactics Estimated Value equipment changes, component
Cost additions, quality improvements,
software interfaces, etc.)
CAmmn
Tactic A: Dummy material CA.
CApt
Tactic B: Compensating material C.bc
Ce~opt
Ccmin
Tactic C: Hardware modification Ceme
cCopt
Camin
Tactic D: Software manipulation Co ___c
Co,pt
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APPENDIX C: Questionnaire for Neutron Counter
Based on your experience and your judgment, please complete the following tables. The details of the
neutron counter setup and the material under detection are shown in the "Safeguard Setup" Section
of Appendix A.
(Please note that the following questions are shown as an example. The actual questionnaire will
contain specific values of M and C derived from Part I of the elicitation)
Question I: The neutron detector uncertainty of measurement (no tactic)
Safeguard Uncertainty of Measurement (%) with 95% confidence level
Estimated Cost Total Mass = Mi,, Total Mass =Mb Total Mass = Mhigh
Cmin
Cbc
Copt
Question II: Probability that the proliferator's tactics will successfully elude the NC
* Tactics A: using dummy material
Proliferator success
Safeguard probability of tactic A
Estimated ± Error with
Cost Point 95% Level ofEstimate Confidence
CAm
CAopt
Tactics C: Modifying the hardware of the
system
Proliferator success
Safeguard probability of tactic C
Estimated ± Error with
Cost Point 95% Level ofEstimate Confidence
Ccba
copt
" Tactic B: placing compensating material in
the detection region
Proliferator success
Safeguard probability of tactic B
Estimated ± Error with
Cost Point 95% Level ofEstimate Confidence
CBsopt
" Tactics D: Modifying the software of the
system
Proliferator success
Safeguard probability of tactic D
Estimated ± Error with
Cost Point 95% Level ofEstimate Confidence
CDmn
CDopt
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